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Executive	  Summary	  
Bangladesh	  has	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  governance	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  scores	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  
in	  South	  Asia	  it	  is	  behind	  India	  and	  Pakistan	  on	  most	  governance	  indicators.	  Yet,	  since	  1980	  it	  
has	  made	  moderate	  to	  good	  progress	  on	  different	  indicators	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  
development,	  prompting	  some	  to	  talk	  of	  the	  ‘Bangladesh	  paradox’.	  An	  analysis	  of	  its	  
economic	  growth	  drivers	  and	  its	  evolving	  political	  settlement	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  paradox	  
and	  to	  identify	  the	  vulnerabilities	  of	  its	  contemporary	  position.	  Economic	  growth	  has	  been	  
driven	  largely	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  single	  globally	  competitive	  sector,	  a	  growing	  inflow	  of	  
remittances,	  stable	  growth	  in	  agriculture,	  and	  effective	  NGOs	  making	  the	  most	  of	  Official	  
Development	  Assistance	  (ODA)	  inflows.	  The	  most	  important	  of	  these	  has	  been	  the	  growth	  of	  
the	  labour-­‐intensive	  garments	  and	  textiles	  sector,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  lucky	  combination	  of	  
events	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  governance	  initiatives	  that	  enabled	  the	  country	  to	  learn	  this	  
technology	  at	  a	  critical	  time.	  The	  subsequent	  emergence	  of	  ‘competitive	  clientelism’	  in	  the	  
1990s	  created	  the	  political	  and	  policy	  stability	  for	  private	  investments	  to	  drive	  growth	  in	  this	  
and	  a	  small	  number	  of	  other	  sectors,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption.	  
This	  pattern	  of	  growth	  is	  unlikely	  to	  continue	  without	  limit	  as	  rapid	  productivity	  growth	  has	  
to	  be	  achieved	  and	  political	  stability	  has	  also	  been	  challenged	  by	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  single-­‐
party	  rule	  after	  the	  controversial	  2014	  elections.	  The	  current	  governance	  arrangements	  are	  
inadequate	  for	  meeting	  these	  challenges.	  
Anti-­‐corruption	  and	  governance	  initiatives	  in	  Bangladesh	  have	  to	  be	  located	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
these	  opportunities	  and	  challenges.	  Anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  in	  Bangladesh	  have	  largely	  
been	  of	  the	  systemic	  type,	  attacking	  corruption	  in	  general,	  with	  policies	  to	  promote	  
transparency,	  investigate	  corruption	  and	  impose	  legal	  penalties	  through	  prosecution.	  When	  
Bangladesh	  acceded	  to	  UNCAC	  in	  2007,	  it	  already	  had	  in	  place	  most	  of	  the	  formal	  legislation	  
to	  be	  potentially	  compliant	  with	  UNCAC	  requirements.	  The	  problem	  has	  been	  that	  
Bangladesh,	  like	  many	  other	  developing	  countries,	  has	  informal	  processes	  and	  power	  
relationships	  that	  prevent	  the	  implementation	  of	  these	  laws.	  A	  direct	  investigative	  attack	  on	  
allegations	  of	  high-­‐level	  corruption	  in	  the	  current	  political	  settlement,	  as	  in	  the	  Padma	  
Bridge	  case,	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  little	  effect	  and	  may	  even	  be	  counterproductive.	  Our	  analysis	  
supports	  an	  incremental	  and	  sector-­‐specific	  approach	  to	  anti-­‐corruption,	  to	  create	  coalitions	  
of	  interests	  that	  can	  support	  the	  solution	  of	  specific	  developmental	  problems.	  If	  systemic	  
improvements	  in	  governance	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  are	  unlikely	  in	  the	  short	  to	  medium	  term,	  
alternative	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  have	  to	  be	  devised	  to	  sustain	  social	  development	  and	  
inclusive	  growth.	  The	  paper	  develops	  an	  analysis	  of	  economic	  drivers	  and	  political	  
settlements	  to	  identify	  a	  range	  of	  sectoral	  issues	  where	  an	  incremental	  and	  sector-­‐specific	  
anti-­‐corruption	  approach	  can	  lead	  to	  feasible	  and	  effective	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  in	  line	  
with	  the	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Evidence	  programme	  (ACE)approach.	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1. Introduction	  
Bangladesh	  is	  at	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  list	  of	  South	  Asian	  countries	  on	  all	  major	  governance	  
indicators.	  As	  Figure	  1	  shows,	  Bangladesh	  had	  the	  worst	  scores	  in	  South	  Asia	  on	  WGI	  
indicators	  for	  the	  control	  of	  corruption,	  regulatory	  quality	  and	  government	  effectiveness,	  
with	  scores	  considerably	  lower	  than	  India,	  and	  even	  lower	  than	  Pakistan,	  which	  has	  suffered	  
from	  severe	  political	  instability	  in	  recent	  years.	  On	  the	  indicators	  for	  rule	  of	  law,	  political	  
stability,	  and	  voice	  and	  accountability	  Bangladesh	  scores	  lower	  than	  India	  but	  just	  above	  
Pakistan.	  Its	  low	  score	  on	  the	  control	  of	  corruption	  is	  an	  important	  reason	  why	  its	  
governance	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  constraining	  its	  ability	  to	  sustain	  its	  success	  in	  growth	  and	  
poverty	  reduction	  in	  the	  future.	  While	  there	  have	  been	  modest	  improvements	  in	  
Bangladesh’s	  corruption	  ranking	  since	  2005,	  it	  is	  still	  in	  the	  bottom	  20	  percent	  of	  countries,	  a	  
status	  that,	  apart	  from	  anything	  else,	  severely	  constrains	  its	  business	  climate	  and	  signals	  
potentially	  serious	  problems	  of	  rent	  capture	  and	  resource	  wastage	  affecting	  its	  
development.	  
Figure	  1:	  Bangladesh	  Governance	  Rankings	  2005-­‐15	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Source:	  World	  Governance	  Indicators	  2016	  
The	  business	  sector	  in	  Bangladesh	  has	  consistently	  ranked	  corruption	  as	  one	  of	  its	  top	  three	  
concerns.	  Figure	  2	  shows	  that	  in	  2016	  executives	  surveyed	  in	  the	  World	  Economic	  Forum’s	  
Executive	  Opinion	  Survey	  ranked	  corruption	  as	  the	  second	  most	  constraining	  factor	  for	  doing	  
business	  in	  Bangladesh.	  Some	  of	  the	  other	  important	  factors	  identified	  by	  these	  executives	  
as	  constraints	  include	  inadequate	  infrastructure,	  bureaucratic	  inefficiency	  and	  poor	  
workforce	  skills.	  The	  persistence	  of	  these	  constraints	  is	  also	  linked	  to	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  
corruption	  as	  corruption	  makes	  infrastructure	  and	  power	  supplies,	  bureaucratic	  capabilities	  
and	  skills	  development	  more	  difficult	  to	  address.	  The	  overall	  impact	  of	  corruption	  on	  
business	  is	  therefore	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  significant.	  	  
Figure	  2:	  Most	  Problematic	  Factors	  for	  Doing	  Business	  in	  Bangladesh	  2016	  
	  
Source:	  Executive	  Opinion	  Survey	  (World	  Economic	  Forum	  2016:	  110).	  The	  numbers	  are	  weighted	  scores	  of	  each	  factor.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Bangladesh	  economy	  has	  been	  growing	  at	  between	  5	  and	  7	  percent	  
per	  annum	  since	  the	  1990s,	  despite	  weak	  governance,	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption	  and	  political	  
instability.	  Moreover,	  growth	  has	  been	  driven	  by	  productive	  sectors	  rather	  than	  natural	  
resource	  extraction,	  with	  private	  investments	  in	  manufacturing	  playing	  an	  important	  role	  in	  
driving	  growth.	  This	  combination	  of	  relatively	  good	  developmental	  outcomes	  in	  a	  context	  of	  
poor	  governance	  has	  led	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  a	  ‘Bangladesh	  paradox’	  (World	  Bank	  2007;	  
Mahmud,	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Our	  political	  settlements	  approach	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  paradox,	  and	  
also	  to	  show	  why	  the	  combination	  of	  growth	  with	  poor	  governance	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  
sustainable	  over	  time.	  Growth	  since	  the	  1990s	  was	  underpinned	  by	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  a	  
small	  number	  of	  low-­‐technology	  sectors	  like	  garments	  and	  textiles,	  while	  a	  competitive	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corruption.	  The	  competitive	  clientelist	  political	  settlement	  also	  delivered	  a	  predictable	  
longer-­‐term	  political	  environment,	  in	  a	  context	  where	  some	  sectors	  were	  already	  globally	  
competitive.	  Investors	  could	  credibly	  believe	  that	  while	  parties	  in	  power	  changed	  regularly,	  
there	  would	  be	  no	  significant	  policy	  changes	  because	  both	  parties	  expected	  to	  come	  back	  to	  
power	  and	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  harming	  growth.	  	  
Changes	  in	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  Bangladesh	  after	  2008	  have	  undermined	  this	  political	  
system.	  Constitutional	  and	  administrative	  changes	  reduced	  the	  chances	  of	  opposition	  parties	  
winning	  an	  election	  and	  dramatically	  increased	  political	  uncertainty.	  As	  the	  return	  to	  power	  
of	  the	  opposition	  through	  elections	  became	  less	  and	  less	  plausible,	  the	  future	  strategies	  of	  
excluded	  groups	  have	  become	  more	  uncertain.	  After	  a	  spurt	  of	  violence	  involving	  the	  
mainstream	  political	  opposition	  around	  the	  2014	  elections	  that	  the	  opposition	  boycotted,	  
mass	  political	  violence	  declined	  as	  a	  result	  of	  severe	  policing.	  But	  there	  have	  been	  worrying	  
signs	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  extremist	  violence	  finding	  political	  space,	  particularly	  after	  the	  killings	  
at	  the	  Holey	  Artisan	  bakery	  in	  Gulshan	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2016	  and	  other	  acts	  of	  sporadic	  
violence.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  official	  violence	  directed	  not	  just	  at	  extremists	  but	  also	  at	  
opposition	  parties	  in	  the	  form	  of	  arrests	  and	  harassment,	  disappearances	  and	  deaths	  in	  
mysterious	  circumstances	  have	  also	  increased.	  Through	  all	  of	  this,	  economic	  growth	  appears	  
to	  have	  been	  sustained,	  even	  though	  there	  are	  questions	  about	  the	  accuracy	  of	  official	  
growth	  figures.	  Even	  if	  growth	  has	  not	  been	  as	  high	  after	  2014	  as	  the	  official	  figures	  suggest,	  
it	  has	  certainly	  not	  collapsed.	  	  
The	  public	  expectation	  is	  that	  employment	  opportunities	  will	  continue	  to	  grow	  and	  wages	  
will	  continue	  to	  rise.	  These	  expectations	  create	  an	  imperative	  to	  achieve	  higher	  productivity	  
growth	  in	  existing	  economic	  sectors	  and	  accelerated	  job	  creation	  in	  new	  sectors	  beyond	  
garments	  and	  textiles.	  The	  political	  tensions	  and	  the	  space	  for	  extremism	  can	  be	  magnified	  if	  
the	  shrinkage	  in	  the	  political	  space	  is	  combined	  with	  a	  serious	  economic	  setback.	  These	  
economic	  imperatives	  provide	  both	  compulsions	  and	  opportunities	  for	  (at	  least)	  some	  
incremental	  governance	  improvements	  provided	  the	  government	  does	  not	  perceive	  every	  
governance	  improvement	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  political	  interests.	  This	  is	  an	  area	  where	  the	  ACE	  
programme	  can	  contribute,	  by	  providing	  evidence-­‐based	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  feasible	  and	  
effective	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  governance	  strategies	  to	  support	  sectoral	  growth	  strategies.	  	  
Governance	  can	  affect	  growth	  (and	  development)	  by	  affecting	  the	  investment	  share	  or	  the	  
economic	  and	  social	  productivity	  of	  investments,	  or	  both.	  If	  poor	  governance	  affects	  either	  
or	  both,	  there	  will	  be	  negative	  effects	  on	  economic	  and	  social	  development.	  Failures	  of	  
governance	  have	  affected	  the	  investment	  share	  in	  Bangladesh	  whenever	  political	  conflicts	  
have	  resulted	  in	  reduced	  private	  investments	  as	  a	  result	  of	  political	  uncertainty.	  This	  
happened	  during	  the	  rule	  of	  General	  Ershad	  and	  has	  emerged	  once	  again	  after	  after	  the	  
abolition	  of	  the	  caretaker	  system	  for	  organising	  elections	  in	  2011.	  Other	  governance	  failures	  
and	  in	  particular	  corruption	  have	  also	  affected	  the	  productivity	  of	  investments	  by	  restricting	  
the	  government’s	  capacity	  to	  provide	  high	  quality	  power	  and	  infrastructure	  at	  a	  reasonable	  
price,	  to	  effectively	  regulate	  industries,	  deliver	  quality	  health	  and	  education	  or	  promote	  the	  
development	  of	  new	  sectors	  with	  targeted	  support	  and	  skills	  training.	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In	  Section	  2	  we	  see	  that	  economic	  growth	  in	  Bangladesh	  since	  the	  1980s	  has	  been	  driven	  by	  
a	  combination	  of	  very	  fortunate	  factors	  that	  include	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  garments	  and	  
textile	  industry	  as	  a	  globally	  competitive	  export	  sector,	  the	  steady	  growth	  of	  remittances,	  
steady	  if	  low	  growth	  in	  agriculture	  and	  a	  political	  environment	  with	  a	  supply	  of	  innovative	  
NGOs	  that	  ensured	  that	  foreign	  aid	  had	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  poverty	  reduction.	  However,	  all	  
of	  these	  factors	  are	  contingent	  and	  sustaining	  growth	  requires	  increasing	  the	  investment	  
share,	  developing	  new	  competitive	  sectors,	  improving	  health,	  education	  and	  skills	  and	  
overcoming	  serious	  limitations	  in	  infrastructure.	  Thus,	  governance	  weaknesses	  have	  in	  the	  
past	  affected	  both	  the	  investment	  share	  and	  the	  productivity	  of	  investments	  and	  of	  public	  
expenditures.	  Corruption	  of	  different	  types	  is	  involved	  in	  all	  these	  processes,	  and	  therefore	  
constitutes	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  the	  sustainability	  of	  growth	  in	  Bangladesh.	  	  
Section	  3	  looks	  at	  how	  political	  conflicts	  and	  governance	  capabilities	  have	  changed	  over	  time	  
in	  terms	  of	  our	  political	  settlements	  framework.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  track	  how	  governance	  
challenges	  have	  changed,	  as	  have	  opportunities	  for	  intervention	  in	  different	  areas.	  This	  
analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  major	  acceleration	  in	  Bangladesh’s	  growth	  happened	  in	  the	  
democratic	  period	  of	  ‘competitive	  clientelism’	  as	  this	  political	  arrangement	  was	  relatively	  
inclusive	  and	  the	  competing	  parties	  represented	  similar	  constituencies	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  
interests.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  circulation	  of	  the	  two	  major	  parties	  in	  power	  created	  political	  
stability	  and	  sustained	  high	  rates	  of	  investment.	  This	  political	  settlement	  began	  to	  change	  
after	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  2006-­‐8	  emergency	  that	  attempted	  to	  radically	  reform	  the	  corrupt	  
clientelist	  politics	  that	  had	  characterised	  democratic	  politics	  from	  1990	  to	  2006.	  The	  result	  of	  
the	  failure	  was	  that	  the	  party	  that	  won	  the	  2008	  elections	  found	  it	  possible	  to	  restrict	  the	  
political	  space	  and	  moved	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  ‘vulnerable	  authoritarianism’	  in	  the	  
terminology	  of	  the	  political	  settlements	  classifications	  in	  my	  2010	  paper	  (Khan	  2010).	  Even	  
though	  the	  forms	  of	  democracy	  have	  been	  maintained,	  the	  2014	  election	  was	  uncontested	  
and	  subsequent	  elections	  have	  been	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  administrative	  interference.	  This	  
is	  arguably	  an	  unstable	  political	  arrangement	  in	  Bangladesh,	  given	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  
potential	  organisational	  power	  of	  social	  networks,	  even	  if	  the	  dominance	  of	  one	  party	  is	  
maintained	  for	  a	  while	  through	  effective	  restrictions	  on	  opposition	  activities	  and	  an	  
unprecedented	  politicisation	  of	  the	  administration.	  This	  unusual	  context	  is	  the	  backdrop	  for	  
assessing	  opportunities	  and	  challenges	  for	  governance	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  interventions.	  	  
Section	  4	  looks	  at	  the	  background	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  laws	  and	  agencies	  in	  Bangladesh.	  
Bangladesh	  acceded	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Conventions	  against	  Corruption	  (UNCAC)	  in	  2007	  
and	  it	  has	  in	  place	  almost	  all	  the	  requisite	  formal	  laws.	  However,	  enforcement	  has	  been	  very	  
poor,	  in	  line	  with	  our	  expectation	  that	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  will	  work	  poorly	  in	  
developing	  countries,	  particularly	  those	  characterised	  by	  competitive	  clientelism	  or	  
vulnerable	  authoritarianism	  (Khan	  et	  al.	  2017).	  We	  outline	  some	  of	  the	  evidence	  of	  major	  
corruption	  scandals	  and	  the	  responses	  to	  them	  in	  recent	  years,	  which	  suggest	  that	  a	  frontal	  
or	  systemic	  attack	  on	  corruption	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  effective.	  This	  is	  generally	  true	  in	  
developing	  countries,	  but	  is	  particularly	  true	  in	  Bangladesh	  today	  where,	  unlike	  Tanzania	  or	  
Nigeria,	  the	  other	  focus	  countries	  of	  the	  ACE	  programme,	  anti-­‐corruption	  is	  not	  even	  a	  
political	  priority	  for	  the	  government	  in	  power.	  In	  this	  context	  we	  argue	  that	  an	  incremental	  
approach	  to	  anti-­‐corruption	  is	  the	  only	  feasible	  way	  forward,	  and	  this	  is	  in	  line	  with	  our	  
approach	  to	  anti-­‐corruption	  in	  adverse	  contexts	  (Khan	  et	  al.	  2017).	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We	  conclude	  in	  Section	  5	  by	  identifying	  strategic	  opportunities	  for	  anti-­‐corruption	  work	  in	  
Bangladesh	  using	  our	  incremental	  intervention	  approach.	  Our	  analysis	  of	  growth	  in	  
Bangladesh	  and	  of	  growth	  challenges	  helps	  us	  to	  identify	  priority	  sectors	  where	  improved	  
resource	  allocation	  outcomes	  could	  have	  a	  big	  impact.	  This,	  together	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  
challenges	  posed	  by	  characteristics	  of	  the	  political	  settlement,	  leads	  us	  to	  select	  some	  
feasible	  areas	  for	  incremental	  anti-­‐corruption	  work.	  These	  are	  areas	  where	  the	  ruling	  
coalition	  is	  unlikely	  to	  perceive	  incremental	  anti-­‐corruption	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  its	  interests.	  As	  our	  
anti-­‐corruption	  strategy	  is	  not	  based	  on	  enforcing	  rules	  across	  all	  powerful	  organizations	  
from	  above,	  but	  rather	  on	  trying	  to	  change	  institutions	  and	  policies	  to	  create	  incentives	  for	  
some	  powerful	  stakeholders	  to	  behave	  in	  more	  productive	  ways	  in	  specific	  sectors,	  the	  
government	  may	  even	  see	  the	  benefits	  of	  improving	  developmental	  outcomes	  in	  these	  ways	  
in	  critical	  sectors.	  These	  are	  the	  likely	  areas	  where	  feasible	  and	  high-­‐impact	  anti-­‐corruption	  
strategies	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  developed.	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2. Major	  sectors	  and	  drivers	  of	  
growth	  in	  Bangladesh	  
Table	  1	  shows	  that	  all	  three	  large	  South	  Asian	  countries	  experienced	  growth	  accelerations	  in	  
the	  1980s,	  though	  this	  happened	  for	  somewhat	  different	  reasons.	  In	  Bangladesh,	  the	  
acceleration	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  the	  export-­‐oriented	  garments	  and	  textiles	  
sector,	  together	  with	  moderate	  growth	  in	  agriculture,	  a	  growing	  flow	  of	  remittances	  from	  
Bangladeshi	  workers	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  elsewhere,	  and	  in	  the	  early	  years,	  significant	  
flows	  of	  foreign	  assistance	  that	  contributed	  to	  poverty	  reduction	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
innovative	  NGOs.	  Growth	  in	  Bangladesh	  continued	  to	  accelerate	  over	  the	  next	  three	  
decades,	  overtaking	  Pakistan	  in	  the	  2000s.	  In	  a	  dramatic	  reversal	  of	  fortune,	  Pakistan,	  which	  
had	  the	  highest	  growth	  in	  South	  Asia	  up	  to	  the	  1980s,	  became	  the	  slowest	  growing	  region	  in	  
the	  1990s.	  Apart	  from	  the	  regional	  conflicts	  that	  affected	  Pakistan	  from	  the	  1990s	  onwards,	  
this	  reversal	  of	  fortune	  had	  a	  lot	  to	  do	  with	  Bangladesh’s	  relative	  success	  in	  a	  few	  export-­‐
oriented	  manufacturing	  sectors.	  	  
Table	  1:	  Growth	  in	  South	  Asia	  1960-­‐2015	  
	   Bangladesh	   India	   Pakistan	  
	   	   GDP	  Growth	  Rates	   	  
1960-­‐80	   2.4	   3.5	   5.9	  
1980-­‐90	   4.0	   5.6	   6.3	  
1990-­‐00	   4.7	   5.6	   3.9	  
2000-­‐05	   5.1	   6.7	   5.0	  
2005-­‐10	   6.1	   6.7	   3.4	  
2010-­‐15	   6.3	   6.7	   4.0	  
	   	   Per	  Capita	  GDP	  Growth	  Rates	   	  
1960-­‐80	   -­‐0.3	   1.2	   3.1	  
1980-­‐90	   1.3	   3.2	   2.9	  
1990-­‐00	   2.5	   3.6	   1.4	  
2000-­‐05	   3.3	   5.0	   2.8	  
2005-­‐10	   4.8	   6.5	   1.3	  
2010-­‐15	   5.1	   5.4	   1.8	  
Source:	  World	  Bank.	  World	  Development	  Indicators.	  http://data.worldbank.org/data-­‐catalog/world-­‐development-­‐indicators	  (accessed	  
February	  2017)	  and	  Handbook	  of	  Statistics	  on	  Pakistan	  Economy,	  2015.	  
2.1. Governance	  effects	  on	  the	  investment	  share	  
Figure	  3	  shows	  that	  the	  growth	  acceleration	  in	  Bangladesh	  since	  the	  early	  1980s	  was	  
associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  aggregate	  investment	  share,	  and	  particularly	  an	  increase	  
in	  the	  private	  investment	  share.	  Private	  investments	  grew	  as	  the	  nationalizations	  of	  the	  early	  
1970s	  were	  reversed	  and	  new	  competitive	  sectors	  emerged.	  The	  productivity	  of	  private	  
sector	  investments	  was	  greatly	  helped	  by	  organisational	  learning	  in	  key	  manufacturing	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sectors,	  particularly	  in	  garments	  and	  textiles.	  This	  helped	  to	  sustain	  private	  investment	  by	  
making	  it	  profitable	  to	  invest.	  However,	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  take-­‐off	  was	  
short-­‐lived.	  The	  private	  investment	  share	  declined	  between	  1982	  and	  1989.	  The	  crisis	  was	  
driven	  mainly	  by	  the	  growing	  and	  increasingly	  violent	  opposition	  to	  the	  autocratic	  rule	  of	  
General	  Ershad,	  which	  damaged	  the	  investment	  climate	  and	  investor	  expectations.	  As	  soon	  
as	  Ershad	  stepped	  down	  in	  1990,	  and	  a	  democratic	  process	  was	  restored,	  private	  investment	  
immediately	  picked	  up	  as	  political	  instability	  ended.	  	  
Figure	  3:	  Investment	  and	  the	  growth	  acceleration	  from	  the	  1980s	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  World	  Bank	  (2015a).	  Does	  not	  include	  the	  reduced	  estimate	  for	  GDP	  growth	  in	  2015.	  	  
Trend	  lines:	  For	  the	  total	  and	  private	  investment	  shares,	  polynomial	  curves	  describe	  the	  trend.	  For	  the	  GDP	  growth	  rate	  a	  power	  trendline	  
is	  used	  to	  summarize	  the	  acceleration	  and	  flattening	  out,	  while	  for	  per	  capita	  GDP	  a	  logarithmic	  trend	  is	  fitted	  because	  of	  occasional	  
negative	  values.	  	  
The	  democratic	  period	  from	  1990	  to	  2006	  saw	  a	  steady	  increase	  in	  the	  private	  investment	  
share,	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  two-­‐party	  competitive	  clientelism	  at	  least	  had	  the	  merit	  of	  
creating	  stable	  investor	  expectations	  of	  political	  stability.	  Political	  stability	  was	  achieved	  at	  
the	  cost	  of	  high	  levels	  of	  political	  corruption,	  because	  all	  powerful	  coalitions	  had	  a	  chance	  of	  
sequentially	  accessing	  political	  rents.	  The	  system	  hit	  a	  crisis	  in	  2006	  over	  the	  organisation	  of	  
elections	  and	  a	  two-­‐year	  emergency	  government	  failed	  to	  resolve	  it.	  The	  private	  investment	  
share	  reached	  a	  peak	  in	  2009	  and	  then	  once	  again	  flattened	  out	  exactly	  at	  the	  time	  when	  
the	  continuation	  of	  political	  stability	  through	  competitive	  clientelism	  was	  no	  longer	  assured.	  
Political	  uncertainty	  increased	  further	  in	  2011	  when	  the	  ruling	  party	  abolished	  the	  interim	  
government	  system	  which	  had	  ensured	  elections	  were	  reasonably	  free	  and	  fair.	  The	  private	  
investment	  share	  began	  to	  immediately	  decline	  after	  2012.	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  even	  
with	  other	  aspects	  of	  weak	  governance,	  if	  political	  stability	  can	  be	  sustained	  in	  Bangladesh	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Bangladesh:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
11	  
through	  a	  democratic	  process,	  private	  investment	  remains	  buoyant.	  However,	  significant	  
improvements	  in	  the	  private	  investment	  share	  in	  the	  long-­‐run	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  require	  steps	  
to	  improve	  the	  productivity	  of	  investments.	  	  	  
The	  World	  Bank	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  aggregate	  investment	  share	  in	  Bangladesh	  has	  to	  rise	  by	  
at	  least	  another	  five	  percent	  of	  GDP	  from	  the	  28	  percent	  reached	  in	  2015	  if	  growth	  is	  to	  be	  
sustained	  (World	  Bank	  2015b:	  15).	  The	  acceleration	  in	  the	  growth	  rate	  has	  also	  flattened	  
out,	  with	  growth	  rates	  appearing	  to	  stabilize	  at	  around	  the	  6	  percent	  level,	  well	  before	  
reaching	  the	  8-­‐10	  percent	  levels	  required	  to	  sustain	  rapid	  poverty	  reduction.	  There	  is	  some	  
question	  about	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  growth	  figures	  provided	  by	  the	  Bangladesh	  government,	  
which	  show	  that	  economic	  growth	  has	  continued	  to	  rise	  after	  2012	  despite	  declining	  private	  
investments.	  The	  World	  Bank	  (2015b:	  11)	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  2015	  growth	  figure	  for	  
Bangladesh	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  an	  overestimate	  given	  the	  political	  disruptions	  that	  happened	  in	  
the	  earlier	  part	  of	  the	  year,	  and	  the	  official	  growth	  rates	  of	  close	  to	  7	  percent	  for	  2016	  and	  
2017	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  overestimates,	  particularly	  given	  the	  slowdown	  in	  private	  
investments.	  The	  available	  data	  on	  investments	  and	  growth	  taken	  together	  suggest	  that	  
growth	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  held	  up	  at	  around	  the	  6	  percent	  level,	  but	  that	  this	  rate	  is	  
unsustainable	  unless	  private	  investments	  and	  the	  productivity	  of	  investments	  begin	  to	  
rapidly	  improve.	  	  
2.2. Governance	  effects	  on	  productivity	  	  
The	  effects	  of	  poor	  governance	  on	  the	  productivity	  of	  investments	  in	  Bangladesh	  is	  more	  
complex.	  According	  to	  the	  Doing	  Business	  surveys	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  Bangladesh’s	  ranking	  
declined	  from	  122	  (out	  of	  183)	  in	  2012	  to	  174	  (out	  of	  189)	  in	  2016.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  ease	  of	  
getting	  electricity	  for	  a	  business	  venture,	  Bangladesh	  declined	  from	  182	  out	  of	  183	  countries	  
in	  2012	  to	  the	  bottom	  position	  of	  189	  out	  of	  189	  countries	  in	  2016	  (World	  Bank	  2012:	  81,	  
2016:	  187).	  Beyond	  these	  obstacles,	  the	  government	  has	  limited	  capacity	  to	  efficiently	  
address	  critical	  market	  failures	  constraining	  the	  development	  of	  new	  sectors,	  such	  as	  
managing	  effective	  incentive	  schemes	  for	  investments	  in	  new	  sectors,	  providing	  support	  for	  
technology	  acquisition,	  ensuring	  effective	  regulation	  and	  providing	  critical	  public	  services	  
including	  health,	  education,	  skills	  delivery,	  infrastructure,	  power	  generation	  and	  so	  on.	  One	  
of	  the	  critical	  failures	  of	  governance	  affecting	  the	  productivity	  of	  private	  investments	  has	  
been	  the	  low	  capacity	  of	  the	  government	  to	  achieve	  efficient	  outcomes	  in	  each	  of	  these	  
areas.	  These	  shortcomings	  are	  indirectly	  captured	  in	  the	  WGI	  indicators	  reported	  in	  Figure	  1,	  
but	  they	  are	  directly	  visible	  in	  the	  poor	  quality	  and	  high	  cost	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  power	  
supplies,	  the	  poor	  quality	  of	  education	  and	  skills,	  the	  poor	  quality	  and	  coverage	  of	  the	  health	  
system	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
The	  effects	  of	  governance	  on	  the	  efficiency	  of	  investments	  (their	  productivity)	  and	  on	  the	  
investment	  share	  are	  interdependent.	  If	  the	  efficiency	  of	  investments	  is	  low,	  profitability	  will	  
be	  low	  and	  the	  investment	  share	  will	  eventually	  start	  to	  decline.	  Equally,	  if	  the	  investment	  
share	  is	  too	  low,	  productivity	  and	  productivity	  growth	  will	  be	  low.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  effects	  of	  
poor	  governance	  on	  these	  two	  drivers	  of	  growth	  are	  often	  difficult	  to	  distinguish.	  
Nevertheless,	  it	  can	  be	  useful	  to	  make	  a	  conceptual	  distinction	  for	  identifying	  policy	  
priorities	  and	  to	  assess	  the	  implications	  of	  different	  types	  of	  failures	  of	  governance.	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2.3. Garments	  and	  textiles	  driving	  export	  growth	  	  
Despite	  its	  governance	  problems,	  Bangladesh	  achieved	  an	  acceleration	  in	  growth	  from	  the	  
1980s.	  Governance	  was	  just	  ‘good	  enough’	  in	  a	  few	  critical	  areas,	  and	  Bangladesh	  was	  lucky	  
to	  benefit	  from	  a	  number	  of	  global	  opportunities.	  Its	  growth	  has	  been	  driven	  by	  a	  
combination	  of	  four	  factors	  referred	  to	  earlier.	  First,	  there	  has	  been	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  the	  
export-­‐oriented	  garments	  and	  textiles	  industry	  that	  directly	  created	  upwards	  of	  four	  million	  
jobs,	  and	  indirectly	  many	  times	  that	  number	  in	  transportation,	  services,	  packaging	  and	  so	  
on.	  The	  garments	  and	  textiles	  sector	  now	  accounts	  for	  around	  80	  percent	  of	  Bangladesh’s	  
export	  earnings,	  and	  while	  the	  sector	  remains	  at	  the	  lower	  value	  end	  of	  the	  global	  supply	  
chain,	  in	  terms	  of	  total	  exports,	  Bangladesh	  has	  consistently	  been	  in	  the	  top	  two	  or	  three	  
garment-­‐exporting	  countries	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years.	  	  
The	  strong	  growth	  in	  exports	  continued	  despite	  the	  global	  slowdown	  of	  2008-­‐09	  because	  the	  
cheaper	  garments	  and	  textiles	  that	  Bangladesh	  produced	  benefited	  from	  expenditure	  
switching,	  as	  consumers	  in	  advanced	  countries	  confronted	  austerity.	  More	  recently,	  
merchandise	  exports	  have	  faltered,	  partly	  because	  of	  political	  uncertainties	  of	  2012-­‐13	  
referred	  to	  earlier	  and	  because	  not	  enough	  effort	  has	  been	  put	  into	  diversifying	  the	  
manufacturing	  sector,	  upgrading	  technologies	  and	  improving	  productivity.	  By	  2017	  garments	  
exports	  were	  stagnating	  or	  declining,	  with	  growth	  switching	  to	  India,	  Vietnam	  and	  other	  
countries	  as	  Bangladesh	  suffered	  from	  stagnant	  productivity	  and	  inefficient	  ports	  and	  
infrastructure	  that	  hindered	  exports.	  Merchandise	  exports	  also	  remain	  heavily	  dependent	  
on	  one	  sector	  -­‐	  garments	  and	  textiles	  -­‐	  making	  the	  country	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  
demand	  switches	  in	  that	  sector.	  	  
On	  the	  whole,	  despite	  some	  of	  the	  more	  advanced	  garments	  producers	  moving	  up	  the	  value	  
chain	  through	  backward	  linkages	  and	  producing	  higher-­‐valued	  garments,	  the	  Bangladesh	  
garment	  industry	  continues	  to	  operate	  at	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  global	  value	  chain.	  Wage	  
rates	  in	  the	  industry	  are	  also	  known	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  lowest	  internationally	  and	  the	  lowest	  
amongst	  its	  regional	  South	  Asian	  competitors	  (Ahmed	  and	  Hossain	  2006:	  Figure	  4).	  Wages	  
and	  conditions	  in	  the	  garments	  industry	  have	  therefore	  become	  a	  growing	  source	  of	  friction	  
between	  management	  and	  workers.	  After	  the	  Rana	  Plaza	  building	  collapse	  in	  2013	  in	  which	  
more	  than	  1000	  garments	  workers	  died,	  there	  has	  been	  growing	  pressure	  on	  the	  industry	  to	  
improve	  the	  quality	  of	  its	  building	  infrastructure	  and	  to	  raise	  productivity	  to	  enable	  higher	  
wages.	  International	  inspection	  and	  certification	  agreements	  like	  Accord	  and	  Alliance	  
involving	  global	  buyers	  have	  considerably	  improved	  the	  situation	  in	  building	  safety	  and	  
infrastructure	  since	  then.	  However,	  while	  moving	  up	  the	  value	  chain	  into	  higher	  value-­‐added	  
products	  and	  raising	  productivity	  in	  existing	  lines	  are	  critically	  important	  challenges	  for	  
Bangladesh,	  progress	  in	  these	  areas	  has	  been	  slow.	  
2.4. Remittances	  	  
A	  second	  driver	  of	  inclusive	  growth	  has	  been	  a	  steady	  growth	  of	  remittances	  as	  millions	  of	  
relatively	  low-­‐skilled	  Bangladeshi	  workers	  found	  employment	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  South	  
East	  Asia	  where,	  paradoxically,	  low-­‐skilled	  and	  low-­‐wage	  workers	  were	  often	  in	  short	  supply.	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Workers	  from	  poor	  backgrounds	  have	  families	  that	  are	  dependent	  on	  their	  remittances,	  so	  a	  
very	  large	  percentage	  of	  their	  earnings	  are	  remitted.	  This	  sustained	  demand	  in	  rural	  areas,	  
supporting	  education	  and	  allowing	  construction	  activities	  that	  improved	  living	  standards.	  
Remittances	  from	  unskilled	  Bangladeshi	  workers	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  South	  East	  Asia	  are	  
unlikely	  to	  keep	  growing	  and	  may	  even	  fall,	  as	  the	  demand	  for	  unskilled	  labour	  may	  shrink	  
over	  the	  next	  few	  years	  if	  oil	  prices	  and	  the	  global	  economy	  remain	  weak.	  	  
Remittances	  reached	  a	  peak	  of	  about	  ten	  percent	  of	  GDP	  around	  2008	  and	  has	  stagnated	  at	  
that	  level	  since	  then,	  with	  some	  reductions	  in	  recent	  years.	  Apart	  from	  the	  possible	  slowing	  
down	  in	  the	  demand	  for	  workers	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  South	  East	  Asia,	  there	  is	  also	  
evidence	  of	  significant	  rent	  extraction	  from	  potential	  migrants	  from	  Bangladesh	  by	  
unscrupulous	  manpower	  export	  businesses,	  operating	  in	  close	  collusion	  with	  political	  
patrons	  and	  overseas	  labour	  importers.	  The	  extraction	  of	  large	  charges	  and	  bribes	  from	  
potential	  migrants	  contributes	  to	  capping	  numbers,	  and	  diverts	  resources	  from	  the	  poor	  into	  
the	  pockets	  of	  powerful	  labour-­‐export	  intermediaries.	  	  
2.5. Agriculture	  
A	  third	  driver	  of	  growth	  has	  been	  agriculture	  where	  there	  has	  been	  a	  steady	  improvement	  in	  
yields	  through	  the	  spread	  of	  ‘green	  revolution’	  technologies.	  Population	  pressure	  on	  the	  
land	  was	  reduced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  departure	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  underemployed	  farm	  
workers	  to	  manufacturing	  and	  to	  overseas	  job	  markets.	  This	  alone	  contributed	  to	  raising	  
labour	  productivity	  on	  the	  land.	  As	  Table	  2	  shows,	  agricultural	  growth	  rates	  in	  Bangladesh	  
have	  been	  steady	  and	  have	  been	  higher	  than	  other	  South	  Asian	  countries	  in	  the	  last	  fifteen	  
years.	  But	  sustaining	  this	  may	  be	  difficult	  as	  agriculture	  suffers	  from	  a	  number	  of	  structural	  
constraints.	  Despite	  outmigration	  from	  agriculture,	  farm	  sizes	  are	  shrinking	  under	  
population	  pressure	  as	  land	  becomes	  subdivided	  through	  inheritance.	  Shrinking	  farm	  sizes	  
makes	  it	  more	  difficult	  for	  farmers	  to	  mobilise	  investments,	  and	  mechanisation	  and	  
irrigation	  become	  technically	  more	  difficult.	  Some	  of	  these	  obstacles	  can	  be	  overcome	  using	  
collective	  solutions	  to	  pool	  resources	  and	  to	  share	  investments	  in	  machines	  and	  irrigation	  
networks,	  but	  these	  become	  progressively	  more	  difficult	  as	  farm	  sizes	  keep	  falling.	  
Moreover,	  there	  are	  signs	  that	  greater	  fertilizer	  and	  pesticide	  use	  cannot	  keep	  raising	  yields,	  
and	  the	  water	  table	  is	  also	  dropping	  (Titumir	  2013).	  	  
Table	  2:	  Comparative	  growth	  in	  agriculture	  in	  South	  Asia	  
	  	   1980-­‐1990	   1990-­‐2000	   2000-­‐2010	   2010-­‐2015	  
Bangladesh	   2.2	   3.6	   4.4	   4.0	  
India	   4.4	   2.9	   2.4	   3.4	  
Pakistan	   4.3	   4.4	   3.2	   2.3	  
Source:	  World	  Bank.	  World	  Development	  Indicators.	  http://data.worldbank.org/data-­‐catalog/world-­‐development-­‐indicators	  (accessed	  
February	  2017)	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Table	  3:	  Land	  fragmentation	  in	  Bangladesh	  1984-­‐1997	  
Size	  of	  holdings	  
(acres)	  
1983-­‐4	  Census	   1996-­‐7	  Census	  
Frequency	  (%)	   Owned	  Area	  (%)	   Frequency	  (%)	   Owned	  Area	  (%)	  
Small	  (0.05-­‐2.5)	   75.4	   18.2	   83.1	   26.2	  
Medium	  (2.5-­‐7.5)	   19.9	   56.2	   14.3	   56.3	  
Large	  (7.5-­‐	  )	   4.7	   25.6	   2.6	   17.5	  
Source:	  World	  Bank	  (2000:	  Tables	  1.5	  and	  1.6).	  
The	  agricultural	  sector	  in	  Bangladesh	  is	  characterised	  by	  tiny	  farms	  and	  significant	  surplus	  
labour.	  Table	  3	  shows	  that	  land	  sizes	  are	  small	  and	  getting	  smaller	  over	  time,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
population	  growth	  and	  the	  division	  of	  land	  through	  inheritance.	  In	  the	  1997	  census,	  farms	  over	  
7.5	  acres	  in	  size	  accounted	  for	  only	  2.6	  percent	  of	  farms	  and	  17.5	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  arable	  
land.	  The	  figures	  describe	  an	  important	  constraint	  on	  raising	  agricultural	  productivity.	  Small	  
farm	  sizes	  not	  only	  constrain	  basic	  mechanization,	  the	  small	  farmers	  themselves	  typically	  do	  
not	  have	  access	  to	  sufficient	  capital	  to	  develop	  new	  farming	  methods	  and	  technologies.	  	  
Moves	  towards	  land	  consolidation	  through	  the	  land	  market	  face	  considerable	  resistance,	  as	  
risk	  averse	  small	  farmers	  are	  generally	  unwilling	  to	  sell	  land	  at	  market	  prices.	  An	  additional	  
problem	  for	  policy-­‐makers	  is	  that	  yields	  on	  micro-­‐farms	  can	  appear	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  yields	  
on	  slightly	  larger	  farms.	  This	  has	  several	  causes	  but	  the	  main	  one	  is	  that	  larger	  farms	  face	  a	  
relative	  disadvantage	  in	  terms	  of	  supervising	  very	  labour-­‐intensive	  farming	  technologies.	  In	  
contrast,	  smaller	  farms	  can	  use	  family	  labour	  to	  supervise	  higher	  labour	  inputs	  per	  unit	  of	  
land.	  Large	  farms	  can	  achieve	  higher	  yields	  only	  when	  they	  cross	  a	  minimum	  threshold	  of	  
size	  that	  allows	  mechanisation	  and	  other	  technologies	  that	  require	  less	  intensive	  labour	  use	  
and	  supervision.	  The	  extreme	  fragmentation	  of	  land	  in	  Bangladesh	  means	  that	  small	  
increases	  in	  size	  (from	  micro	  to	  small)	  can	  actually	  appear	  to	  be	  lowering	  yields.	  A	  simplistic	  
interpretation	  of	  this	  inverse	  size-­‐productivity	  relationship	  can	  lead	  to	  misleading	  policy	  
conclusions	  that	  support	  the	  growth	  of	  even	  smaller	  farms	  as	  a	  good	  thing.	  The	  emergence	  
of	  smaller	  farms	  may	  appear	  to	  raise	  yields	  in	  the	  very	  short	  run,	  but	  they	  are	  unviable	  in	  the	  
longer	  run	  when	  growth	  depends	  on	  raising	  labour	  productivity	  using	  mechanisation	  and	  
new	  technologies	  (Khan	  2004;	  Titumir	  2013).	  
Despite	  these	  constraints,	  Bangladeshi	  agriculture	  has	  achieved	  long-­‐run	  growth	  rates	  of	  
around	  three	  percent	  per	  annum	  that	  are	  comparable	  to	  neighbouring	  countries.	  This	  has	  
been	  achieved	  through	  the	  spread	  of	  green	  revolution	  technologies	  of	  high-­‐yielding	  seed	  
varieties,	  combined	  with	  steady	  increases	  in	  fertilizer	  and	  pesticide	  use.	  These	  technologies	  
are	  neutral	  to	  scale	  up	  to	  a	  point	  and	  Bangladesh’s	  small	  land	  sizes	  did	  not	  constrain	  the	  
adoption	  of	  these	  technologies.	  The	  shorter	  crop	  cycles	  of	  high-­‐yielding	  varieties	  of	  rice	  also	  
allowed	  the	  country	  to	  move	  from	  single	  to	  double	  cropping,	  and	  in	  many	  areas	  to	  triple	  
cropping.	  The	  growth	  that	  was	  unleashed	  through	  the	  increase	  in	  cropping	  intensity	  is	  likely	  
to	  be	  exhausted	  over	  the	  next	  ten	  years,	  and	  the	  limits	  to	  fertilizer	  and	  pesticide	  use	  have	  
already	  been	  reached.	  There	  are	  still	  growth	  opportunities	  through	  shifting	  to	  higher	  value	  
crops	  like	  vegetables	  and	  fruits	  in	  some	  areas,	  and	  much	  still-­‐unexploited	  potential	  for	  
developing	  pisciculture.	  Given	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  land,	  the	  role	  of	  cooperatives	  and	  other	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forms	  of	  collective	  or	  pooled	  farming	  or	  fishing	  will	  be	  very	  important.	  Governance	  and	  
corruption	  affect	  the	  development	  of	  these	  collective	  farming	  models	  and	  ACE	  will	  be	  
looking	  at	  these	  issues	  as	  well.	  
2.6. Overseas	  Development	  Assistance	  	  
Finally,	  until	  the	  1990s	  Bangladesh	  also	  received	  significant	  inflows	  of	  overseas	  development	  
assistance	  (ODA)	  and	  it	  was	  lucky	  that	  the	  country’s	  fragmented	  power	  structure	  ensured	  
that	  aid	  could	  not	  be	  captured	  or	  wasted	  by	  a	  narrow	  elite	  at	  the	  top	  (Khan	  2014).	  The	  war	  
of	  independence	  that	  led	  to	  liberation	  in	  1971	  resulted	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  charismatic	  
individuals	  committed	  to	  development,	  like	  Sir	  Fazle	  Hasan	  Abed	  who	  set	  up	  BRAC,	  and	  
Nobel	  Laureate	  Mohammad	  Yunus	  who	  set	  up	  Grameen	  Bank.	  The	  presence	  of	  a	  large	  
number	  of	  locally-­‐owned	  NGOs	  that	  had	  committed	  leaderships	  with	  relatively	  high	  
capabilities	  and	  who	  were	  engaged	  in	  competition	  with	  each	  other	  for	  development	  
resources	  ensured	  many	  innovations	  in	  aid	  delivery.	  As	  a	  result,	  aid	  in	  useful	  forms	  reached	  a	  
much	  broader	  segment	  of	  the	  population	  than	  is	  typical	  in	  many	  other	  developing	  countries	  
at	  similar	  levels	  of	  development.	  Bangladesh	  was	  therefore	  able	  to	  achieve	  better	  results	  in	  
areas	  like	  maternity	  health	  and	  primary	  education,	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  sustained	  inclusive	  
growth,	  and	  prevented	  political	  instability	  running	  out	  of	  control.	  	  	  
Figure	  4:	  Sources	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  
	  
DEPSource:	  Based	  on	  data	  in	  World	  Bank	  (2015a).	  
Figure	  4	  shows	  the	  huge	  transformation	  of	  the	  economy	  driven	  by	  these	  processes.	  Even	  in	  
1980,	  overseas	  development	  assistance	  (ODA)	  was	  the	  main	  source	  of	  foreign	  exchange,	  at	  
around	  7	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  By	  the	  early	  1990s	  merchandise	  exports	  overtook	  ODA	  and	  by	  the	  
mid-­‐1990s,	  so	  did	  remittances.	  By	  2013	  ODA	  commitments	  had	  declined	  to	  around	  2	  percent	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of	  GDP,	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  growth	  in	  GDP,	  while	  merchandise	  exports	  grew	  to	  
contribute	  close	  to	  18	  percent	  of	  GDP,	  and	  remittances	  another	  10	  percent.	  Foreign	  direct	  
investment	  (FDI)	  also	  increased	  since	  the	  early	  1980s,	  but	  is	  still	  negligible	  compared	  to	  
other	  South	  Asian	  countries	  at	  around	  1	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  
There	  has	  also	  been	  steady	  growth	  in	  the	  services	  sector,	  however,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  a	  driver	  of	  
growth.	  The	  service	  sector	  is	  dualistic,	  with	  some	  modern	  services	  like	  banking	  and	  finance,	  
modern	  hospitals	  and	  so	  on	  that	  add	  high	  value	  per	  person,	  and	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  very	  low-­‐
productivity	  activities	  that	  absorbs	  millions	  of	  individuals	  with	  no	  jobs	  in	  manufacturing	  or	  
agriculture	  who	  are	  forced	  to	  eke	  out	  a	  living	  in	  low-­‐wage	  service	  activities.	  These	  include	  very	  
low	  value-­‐adding	  household	  services,	  low	  technology	  transportation,	  peddling	  street	  food,	  and	  
so	  on.	  Bangladesh	  cannot	  rapidly	  increase	  the	  high	  value-­‐adding	  services	  sector	  because,	  
unlike	  India,	  its	  education	  system	  produces	  fewer	  of	  the	  high-­‐human	  capital	  graduates	  that	  are	  
required	  in	  the	  upper	  segments	  of	  the	  service	  sector.	  Therefore,	  a	  rapid	  growth	  of	  per	  capita	  
incomes	  in	  Bangladesh	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  service	  sector	  in	  a	  significant	  way.	  	  
Figure	  5:	  Growing	  shares	  of	  industry	  and	  manufacturing	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  data	  in	  World	  Bank	  (2015a).	  
The	  rapid	  growth	  of	  industry	  and	  manufacturing	  has	  meant	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  GDP	  has	  
changed	  significantly	  over	  this	  period.	  Figure	  5	  shows	  that	  agriculture	  was	  overtaken	  by	  
industry	  in	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  by	  manufacturing	  on	  its	  own	  in	  2012.	  Currently,	  the	  share	  of	  
manufacturing	  at	  around	  18	  percent	  of	  GDP	  is	  comparable	  to	  India,	  but	  it	  is	  concentrated	  in	  
lower-­‐technology	  and	  labour-­‐intensive	  sectors.	  However,	  even	  though	  the	  share	  of	  
agriculture	  in	  GDP	  dropped	  to	  18	  percent	  by	  2010,	  its	  share	  in	  total	  employment	  only	  
declined	  to	  around	  47	  percent	  of	  the	  labour	  force.	  This	  reflects	  the	  low	  productivity	  of	  
labour	  in	  agriculture	  and	  an	  insufficiently	  rapid	  creation	  of	  jobs	  outside	  agriculture	  (Jolliffe,	  
et	  al.	  2013:	  57).	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2.7. Poverty	  reduction	  and	  the	  role	  of	  manufacturing	  	  
The	  performance	  of	  agriculture	  and	  manufacturing	  is	  important	  for	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  
decline	  in	  poverty	  that	  Bangladesh	  achieved	  since	  1980.	  Figure	  6	  shows	  that	  a	  rapid	  decline	  
in	  the	  headcount	  measure	  of	  absolute	  poverty	  was	  achieved	  from	  the	  late	  1980s	  onwards.	  
The	  percentage	  of	  the	  population	  living	  below	  two	  dollars	  a	  day	  declined	  from	  more	  than	  45	  
percent	  in	  1988	  to	  30	  percent	  by	  2010.	  As	  in	  many	  other	  countries,	  the	  available	  data	  also	  
show	  that	  there	  was	  a	  worsening	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  incomes	  over	  the	  same	  period	  of	  time	  
but,	  nevertheless,	  the	  decline	  in	  absolute	  poverty	  was	  an	  important	  achievement	  (World	  
Bank	  2015a).	  
As	  Bangladesh	  does	  not	  have	  significant	  income	  redistribution	  programmes,	  the	  
improvements	  in	  absolute	  poverty	  reduction	  were	  primarily	  achieved	  through	  economic	  
growth.	  The	  relationship	  between	  agricultural	  and	  manufacturing	  growth	  and	  the	  reduction	  
in	  absolute	  poverty	  is	  complex	  and	  different	  studies	  have	  highlighted	  somewhat	  different	  
mechanisms	  through	  which	  this	  happened.	  However,	  as	  there	  are	  significant	  policy	  
implications	  for	  governance	  reforms	  and	  the	  prioritization	  of	  sectors,	  we	  will	  look	  at	  this	  
evidence	  carefully.	  
Figure	  6:	  Reduction	  in	  absolute	  poverty	  
	  
Source:	  Based	  on	  data	  in	  World	  Bank	  (2015a).	  
The	  World	  Bank	  has	  provided	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  drivers	  of	  poverty	  reduction	  between	  
2000	  and	  2010	  (Jolliffe,	  et	  al.	  2013).	  The	  analysis	  uses	  a	  decomposition	  method	  to	  attribute	  
the	  overall	  poverty	  reduction	  to	  different	  factors.	  The	  most	  important	  explanation	  for	  the	  
improvement	  in	  consumption	  levels	  of	  the	  poor	  was	  the	  growth	  of	  labour	  income	  from	  wage	  
growth,	  particularly	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector.	  According	  to	  the	  decomposition,	  47	  percent	  of	  
the	  poverty	  reduction	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  increased	  labour	  income	  on	  farms,	  another	  17	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percent	  to	  increased	  incomes	  in	  other	  sectors,	  and	  25	  percent	  to	  demographic	  changes	  that	  
increased	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  population	  in	  work.	  Only	  11	  percent	  of	  the	  reduction	  is	  
attributed	  to	  international	  remittances	  (Jolliffe,	  et	  al.	  2013:	  53).	  The	  study	  is	  right	  in	  its	  
identification	  of	  returns	  from	  employment	  as	  the	  most	  significant	  contributor	  to	  poverty	  
reduction.	  However,	  the	  overall	  decomposition	  can	  be	  misleading	  if	  wrongly	  interpreted.	  It	  
suggests	  that	  only	  3	  percent	  of	  the	  poverty	  reduction	  was	  due	  to	  intersectoral	  transfers	  of	  
labour	  from	  agriculture	  to	  other	  sectors.	  This	  is	  because	  this	  estimate	  looks	  only	  at	  the	  wage	  
differences	  between	  agriculture	  and	  other	  sectors	  when	  labour	  moves,	  and	  ignores	  the	  huge	  
indirect	  effects	  of	  intersectoral	  labour	  transfers	  on	  agricultural	  incomes.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  wages	  in	  labour-­‐intensive	  manufacturing	  were	  only	  slightly	  higher	  than	  in	  
agriculture	  means	  that	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  wage	  increase	  as	  the	  main	  benefit	  of	  labour	  moving	  
from	  agriculture	  to	  industry,	  there	  was	  only	  a	  3	  percent	  improvement	  in	  incomes.	  However,	  
workers	  leaving	  agriculture	  indirectly	  improved	  incomes	  in	  the	  agricultural	  sector	  and	  this	  
too	  needs	  to	  be	  accounted	  for.	  The	  share	  of	  total	  employment	  in	  agriculture	  declined	  from	  
51	  to	  47	  percent	  over	  the	  decade,	  and	  this	  was	  exactly	  balanced	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  share	  
of	  labour	  in	  industry	  from	  14	  to	  18	  percent.	  With	  a	  labour	  force	  of	  around	  70	  million	  in	  2010,	  
this	  roughly	  translates	  into	  at	  least	  five	  million	  new	  jobs	  being	  created	  over	  the	  decade	  in	  
industry.	  More	  significantly,	  it	  translates	  into	  more	  than	  8	  percent	  of	  the	  agricultural	  
workforce	  leaving	  the	  sector	  over	  a	  decade.	  	  
What	  would	  have	  happened	  to	  agriculture	  and	  agricultural	  incomes	  if	  industrial	  growth	  had	  
not	  absorbed	  millions	  of	  underemployed	  workers	  from	  agriculture	  in	  aggregate?	  The	  impact	  
on	  agricultural	  wages	  and	  poverty	  in	  this	  counterfactual	  is	  difficult	  to	  estimate	  accurately,	  
but	  the	  impact	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  massive.	  If	  the	  8	  percent	  or	  more	  of	  the	  agricultural	  
workforce	  that	  left	  over	  this	  period	  had	  remained	  in	  a	  state	  of	  unemployment	  or	  under-­‐
employment	  in	  agriculture,	  the	  impact	  on	  agricultural	  wage	  growth	  may	  well	  have	  been	  very	  
severe.	  This	  is	  because	  productivity	  improvements	  in	  agriculture	  have	  not	  been	  labour-­‐using,	  
and	  a	  large	  pool	  of	  underemployed	  labour	  would	  have	  depressed	  wage	  growth	  even	  with	  
the	  improvements	  in	  yields	  and	  productivity	  that	  were	  achieved.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  
effectively	  prevented	  much	  or	  all	  of	  the	  improvements	  in	  the	  consumption	  of	  the	  poor	  that	  
were	  observed	  in	  agriculture.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  industrial	  wages	  did	  not	  rise	  much	  despite	  the	  massive	  growth	  in	  
employment	  suggests	  that	  there	  were	  many	  underemployed	  workers	  in	  agriculture	  in	  line	  
with	  the	  model	  of	  Sir	  Arthur	  Lewis	  (1954).	  The	  only	  way	  that	  wages	  can	  actually	  rise	  in	  
agriculture	  in	  these	  contexts	  is	  through	  the	  gradual	  absorption	  of	  surplus	  labour	  in	  gainful	  
employment	  elsewhere.	  In	  Bangladesh	  that	  has	  been	  happening	  through	  labour	  transfers	  to	  
the	  industrial	  sector,	  in	  the	  way	  that	  Lewis	  predicted,	  ultimately	  helping	  to	  raise	  agricultural	  
wages.	  The	  methodology	  of	  the	  Bank	  study	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  satisfactory	  estimate	  of	  the	  
full	  impact	  of	  intersectoral	  labour	  transfers	  on	  poverty	  reduction,	  taking	  into	  account	  both	  
the	  direct	  and	  indirect	  effects.	  But	  background	  studies	  to	  the	  report	  have	  recognised	  the	  
possibly	  much	  greater	  contribution	  of	  manufacturing	  to	  poverty	  reduction	  in	  line	  with	  the	  
Lewis	  model	  (Jolliffe,	  et	  al.	  2013:	  71).	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The	  policy	  implications	  of	  this	  re-­‐evaluation	  are	  very	  significant:	  inclusive	  growth	  greatly	  
benefited	  from	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  employment	  in	  manufacturing	  which	  allowed	  wages	  and	  
incomes	  to	  rise	  from	  very	  low	  levels	  in	  agriculture,	  as	  well	  as	  offering	  slightly	  higher	  wages	  in	  
manufacturing.	  Agriculture	  remains	  the	  biggest	  employer	  of	  labour	  but	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  
average	  productivity	  than	  manufacturing	  or	  services.	  If	  poverty	  reduction	  is	  to	  continue,	  the	  
country	  must	  continue	  to	  create	  millions	  of	  new	  jobs	  in	  labour-­‐intensive	  manufacturing.	  
Even	  though	  the	  impact	  of	  manufacturing	  employment	  on	  poverty	  reduction	  is	  
underestimated	  in	  the	  Bank	  study,	  the	  authors	  make	  robust	  policy	  recommendations	  for	  
supporting	  inclusive	  growth.	  Investments,	  particularly	  in	  skills,	  are	  identified	  as	  important	  for	  
supporting	  job	  creation.	  We	  could	  add	  to	  this	  the	  importance	  of	  policies	  supporting	  the	  
creation	  of	  new	  organisational	  capabilities	  within	  firms	  in	  manufacturing,	  improving	  the	  
supply	  of	  power	  for	  manufacturing	  expansion	  and	  other	  policies	  that	  support	  the	  emergence	  
of	  greater	  numbers	  of	  competitive	  firms	  in	  manufacturing.	  The	  Bank	  study	  also	  recommends	  
better	  targeting	  of	  safety	  nets	  and	  a	  continuation	  of	  support	  for	  family	  planning,	  and	  these	  
are	  obviously	  sensible	  recommendations	  based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  on	  growth	  and	  
poverty	  (Jolliffe,	  et	  al.	  2013:	  xxx-­‐xxxii).	  	  
Despite	  its	  successes	  in	  manufacturing,	  huge	  challenges	  remain	  for	  Bangladesh	  given	  its	  low	  
per	  capita	  income,	  the	  shortage	  of	  skills,	  and	  its	  steadily	  rising	  population.	  While	  its	  
population	  growth	  rate	  has	  declined,	  Bangladesh	  still	  added	  19	  million	  people	  to	  its	  
population	  between	  2000	  and	  2010.	  This	  rate	  of	  increase	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  for	  some	  time,	  
with	  the	  UN	  estimating	  that	  Bangladesh	  will	  add	  another	  21	  million	  people	  between	  2010	  to	  
2020	  (Jolliffe,	  et	  al.	  2013:	  60).	  Services	  and	  agriculture	  are	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  grow	  but	  
given	  the	  constraints	  of	  creating	  high	  wage	  jobs	  in	  services	  and	  the	  constraints	  on	  an	  
acceleration	  of	  agricultural	  growth,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  only	  rapid	  manufacturing	  growth	  based	  on	  
labour-­‐intensive	  technologies	  can	  create	  millions	  of	  new	  jobs	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  wage	  
growth.	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3. Political	  settlements	  and	  political	  
corruption	  in	  Bangladesh	  
The	  political	  settlements	  framework	  looks	  at	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  across	  political	  and	  
economic	  organisations	  in	  a	  society	  (and	  its	  evolution	  over	  time)	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  
types	  of	  policies	  that	  emerge,	  and	  even	  more	  importantly,	  how	  effectively	  policies	  are	  
implemented	  or	  distorted	  by	  the	  organisations	  that	  are	  affected	  by	  them	  (Khan	  2010,	  2012,	  
2013b).	  The	  configuration	  of	  political	  power	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  understanding	  
the	  capabilities	  of	  a	  ruling	  coalition	  in	  implementing	  policies,	  as	  this	  depends	  on	  the	  degree	  
of	  control	  the	  leadership	  has	  over	  the	  ruling	  political	  organisation.	  It	  can	  also	  determine	  the	  
time	  horizon	  and	  commitment	  to	  development	  of	  a	  ruling	  coalition,	  because	  that	  can	  
depend	  on	  its	  confidence	  or	  vulnerability	  relative	  to	  other	  organisations	  that	  are	  currently	  
excluded.	  This	  section	  will	  discuss	  how	  the	  configuration	  of	  political	  power	  has	  evolved	  in	  
Bangladesh	  in	  recent	  decades	  using	  a	  simple	  classification	  of	  types	  of	  political	  configuration	  
summarised	  in	  Box	  1.	  
Box	  1:	  The	  Political	  Settlements	  Analysis	  (PSA)	  
The	  distribution	  of	  organisational	  power	  in	  a	  society	  (its	  political	  settlement)	  is	  an	  
important	  determinant	  of	  the	  policies	  and	  institutions	  that	  emerge	  and	  how	  effectively	  
they	  can	  be	  implemented.	  The	  distribution	  of	  power	  affects	  implementation	  because	  it	  
identifies	  the	  organisations	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  capture	  rents,	  if	  necessary	  by	  distorting	  
formal	  policies.	  The	  distribution	  of	  power	  across	  political	  organisations	  and	  within	  the	  
ruling	  coalition	  are	  both	  important.	  The	  capabilities	  of	  economic	  organisations	  and	  of	  
the	  bureaucracy	  (including	  the	  military)	  are	  also	  important	  components	  of	  the	  overall	  
configuration	  of	  power.	  However,	  the	  configuration	  of	  political	  power	  is	  particularly	  
important	  and	  we	  use	  the	  framework	  in	  Khan	  (2010)	  to	  describe	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	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The	  configuration	  of	  power	  in	  the	  top	  left	  hand	  corner	  of	  the	  diagram	  describes	  
potential	  developmental	  coalitions	  where	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  faces	  weak	  opposition	  
from	  excluded	  groups	  and	  the	  leadership	  has	  effective	  power	  over	  their	  own	  
organisations.	  This	  combination	  results	  in	  long	  time	  horizons,	  as	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  is	  
not	  vulnerable	  and	  significant	  implementation	  capabilities	  as	  its	  lower	  levels	  can	  be	  
disciplined	  by	  higher	  levels.	  These	  coalitions	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  authoritarian	  but	  rarely	  
have	  to	  use	  violence.	  In	  principle,	  they	  could	  also	  be	  elected	  to	  power.	  	  
As	  excluded	  organisations	  become	  more	  powerful,	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  may	  have	  to	  use	  
more	  repression	  or	  violence	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  We	  then	  have	  the	  emergence	  of	  
vulnerable	  authoritarian	  coalitions	  as	  we	  move	  towards	  the	  top	  right.	  These	  coalitions	  
have	  a	  shorter	  time	  horizon	  and	  the	  leadership	  engages	  in	  more	  unproductive	  rent	  
capture	  even	  if	  their	  control	  over	  their	  followers	  remains	  strong.	  
However,	  these	  ruling	  coalitions	  tend	  to	  lose	  control	  over	  lower	  levels	  because	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  control	  lower	  levels	  if	  powerful	  excluded	  organisations	  offer	  them	  better	  
deals.	  Parts	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  can	  begin	  to	  leave	  and	  build	  new	  organisations	  or	  join	  
the	  opposition	  hoping	  to	  get	  better	  deals.	  As	  multiple	  parties	  emerge,	  each	  party	  has	  
weaker	  control	  over	  their	  organisation	  because	  disaffected	  members	  can	  leave.	  We	  are	  
then	  in	  the	  bottom	  right	  hand	  corner	  described	  as	  competitive	  clientelism.	  This	  
configuration	  of	  power	  typically	  supports	  democratic	  competition	  in	  developing	  
countries.	  Democracy	  can	  be	  more	  stable	  and	  less	  repressive	  than	  a	  vulnerable	  
authoritarian	  coalition	  if	  organisational	  power	  has	  actually	  become	  fragmented,	  but	  
democratic	  parties	  also	  have	  short	  time	  horizons	  and	  weak	  implementation	  capacities.	  
If	  the	  competing	  parties	  can	  work	  out	  ‘live	  and	  let	  live’	  arrangements	  of	  replacing	  each	  
other	  in	  power,	  institutional	  and	  policy	  stability	  may	  emerge	  with	  good	  development	  
outcomes	  in	  some	  contexts.	  
Finally,	  a	  configuration	  of	  power	  where	  a	  large	  political	  organisation	  faces	  limited	  
opposition	  can	  result	  in	  a	  weak	  dominant	  party	  in	  the	  bottom	  left	  hand	  corner.	  Such	  a	  
ruling	  coalition	  may	  have	  limited	  implementation	  capability	  because	  by	  including	  almost	  
everyone	  the	  leadership	  pays	  the	  price	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  impose	  discipline	  on	  their	  
own	  organisation.	  These	  ideal	  types	  are	  simplifications	  and	  many	  examples	  lie	  on	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  these	  configurations:	  for	  instance	  dominant	  parties	  with	  strong	  
organisations	  can	  be	  close	  to	  being	  developmental	  coalitions,	  developmental	  coalitions	  
that	  face	  growing	  resistance	  can	  become	  vulnerable	  authoritarianisms	  and	  so	  on	  	  
(Khan	  2010).	  
The	  configuration	  of	  political	  power	  in	  the	  political	  settlement	  of	  Bangladesh	  can	  be	  usefully	  
divided	  into	  four	  phases	  that	  are	  closely	  associated	  with	  changes	  in	  governance	  
characteristics	  that	  affected	  economic	  performance	  (Khan	  2013a).	  The	  trajectory	  of	  the	  
political	  settlement	  since	  1971	  is	  summarised	  in	  Figure	  7	  using	  the	  classification	  in	  Box	  1.	  We	  
summarise	  this	  trajectory	  below	  and	  then	  discuss	  the	  phases	  in	  greater	  detail,	  with	  
particular	  emphasis	  on	  the	  latest	  period,	  to	  draw	  out	  the	  likely	  implications	  for	  opportunities	  
and	  challenges	  for	  governance	  and	  anti-­‐corruption	  reforms.	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Figure	  7:	  The	  evolution	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  Bangladesh	  1971–2017	  
	  
Source:	  Author	  
The	  turbulent	  first	  phase	  from	  1971	  to	  1975	  immediately	  after	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  
country	  was	  one	  of	  a	  dominant	  party	  becoming	  a	  vulnerable	  authoritarianism.	  This	  period	  
included	  an	  attempt	  at	  socialist	  planning	  based	  on	  nationalising	  the	  entire	  modern	  
manufacturing	  sector.	  The	  ruling	  Awami	  League	  had	  campaigned	  for	  Bengali	  rights	  and	  later	  
for	  independence	  under	  the	  charismatic	  leadership	  of	  Sheikh	  Mujibur	  Rahman.	  The	  party	  
was	  initially	  inclusive	  of	  almost	  all	  major	  political	  forces	  in	  the	  country,	  and	  therefore	  the	  
ruling	  coalition	  was	  located	  in	  the	  bottom	  left	  of	  the	  diagram.	  Despite	  Mujib’s	  enormous	  
personal	  popularity,	  his	  party	  failed	  to	  manage	  internal	  political	  competition	  in	  a	  democratic	  
way.	  Its	  attempt	  to	  create	  a	  one-­‐party	  state	  (the	  Workers	  and	  Peasants	  Awami	  League	  or	  
BAKSAL)	  as	  a	  way	  of	  imposing	  discipline	  on	  its	  supporters	  created	  a	  vulnerable	  
authoritarianism	  that	  was	  very	  unpopular	  and	  did	  not	  last.	  The	  period	  ended	  with	  the	  
assassination	  of	  the	  President	  by	  disgruntled	  junior	  army	  officers.	  	  
The	  second	  phase,	  from	  1975	  to	  1990,	  saw	  a	  managed	  return	  to	  multi-­‐party	  politics	  under	  
parties	  led	  by	  ex-­‐military	  rulers.	  This	  was	  a	  hybrid	  period	  ,with	  characteristics	  of	  both	  
vulnerable	  authoritarianism	  and	  competitive	  clientelism.	  We	  have	  described	  this	  hybrid	  
elsewhere	  as	  authoritarian	  clientelism	  (Khan	  2013a),	  located	  somewhere	  between	  the	  two	  
boxes	  on	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  in	  Box	  1.	  Ex-­‐military	  rulers	  were	  in	  power,	  but	  they	  formed	  
political	  parties	  and	  opened	  up	  the	  political	  space	  to	  enable	  multi-­‐party	  politics	  to	  begin	  
again.	  This	  period	  combined	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	  with	  some	  authoritarian	  limits	  on	  the	  
extent	  of	  political	  competition	  that	  was	  allowed.	  The	  overthrow	  of	  General	  Ershad	  in	  1990	  
brought	  in	  a	  period	  of	  democratic	  competition	  without	  restrictions	  on	  the	  political	  activities	  

































































































Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Bangladesh:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
23	  
The	  years	  of	  competitive	  clientelism	  from	  1990	  to	  2006	  were,	  in	  hindsight,	  a	  halcyon	  period	  
for	  Bangladesh.	  The	  admittedly	  shaky	  political	  institutions	  of	  democracy	  were	  in	  equilibrium	  
with	  the	  competitive	  clientelist	  distribution	  of	  power.	  As	  a	  result,	  all	  powerful	  political	  
factions	  had	  a	  reasonable	  chance	  of	  getting	  to	  power	  and	  accessing	  political	  rents.	  This	  in	  
turn	  created	  investor	  confidence	  in	  the	  long-­‐term	  stability	  of	  the	  political	  system.	  Much	  of	  
the	  growth	  acceleration	  in	  Bangladesh	  happened	  in	  this	  phase	  of	  open	  multi-­‐party	  
competitive	  democracy.	  The	  economic	  interventions	  that	  allowed	  capability	  development	  in	  
garments	  had	  already	  happened	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  Now	  a	  period	  of	  political	  predictability	  led	  
to	  sustained	  improvements	  in	  private	  investment.	  This	  was	  the	  period	  in	  which	  the	  term	  
‘Bangladesh	  paradox’	  was	  born.	  High	  levels	  of	  corruption	  and	  apparently	  weak	  governance	  
coexisted	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  private	  investment,	  export	  growth	  and	  accelerating	  growth	  
rates.	  The	  democratic	  phase	  came	  to	  an	  end	  in	  2006,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  failure	  by	  the	  two	  major	  
parties	  to	  institutionalise	  credible	  electoral	  rules.	  There	  followed	  a	  two-­‐year	  interregnum	  of	  
a	  military-­‐backed	  Emergency	  Government	  that	  ended	  with	  elections	  that	  brought	  in	  a	  new	  
Awami	  League	  government.	  
The	  fourth	  phase,	  which	  began	  in	  2008	  with	  the	  election	  of	  a	  new	  Awami	  League	  
government,	  has	  seen	  an	  evolution	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  away	  from	  competitive	  
clientelism	  towards	  an	  effective	  one-­‐party	  system.	  The	  underlying	  changes	  in	  the	  
distribution	  of	  organisational	  power	  are	  still	  fluid	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  (2017)	  and	  the	  
following	  analysis	  therefore	  outlines	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  scenarios	  for	  the	  future.	  On	  the	  
basis	  of	  the	  available	  information,	  the	  emerging	  one-­‐party	  system	  in	  Bangladesh	  is	  not	  a	  
move	  back	  towards	  a	  dominant	  party	  in	  terms	  of	  Box	  1,	  because	  a	  true	  dominant	  party	  is	  
based	  on	  a	  ruling	  coalition	  that	  includes	  all	  major	  political	  networks	  and	  organisations.	  
Rather,	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  new	  one-­‐party	  system	  is	  more	  accurately	  a	  move	  towards	  a	  
vulnerable	  authoritarianism,	  where	  a	  ruling	  coalition	  stays	  in	  power	  by	  enforcing	  electoral	  
rules	  of	  its	  own	  choice	  and	  restricting	  the	  organisational	  freedoms	  of	  the	  opposition.	  	  
The	  current	  transitional	  stage	  can	  be	  described	  as	  ‘authoritarian	  clientelism’,	  which	  is	  a	  stage	  
between	  competitive	  clientelism	  and	  vulnerable	  authoritarianism.	  The	  ruling	  coalition	  uses	  
organisational	  restrictions	  on	  the	  opposition,	  but	  is	  itself	  not	  very	  consolidated	  and	  
disciplined	  and	  some	  opposition	  activity	  takes	  place.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  configuration	  is	  not	  
stable	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  evolve	  further	  in	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  ways,	  depending	  on	  
mobilisations	  and	  counter-­‐mobilisations	  by	  different	  forces.	  In	  the	  first	  scenario,	  the	  ruling	  
coalition	  can	  move	  further	  northwards	  in	  box	  1	  by	  consolidating	  its	  own	  discipline	  to	  further	  
limit	  the	  scope	  of	  opposition	  activities.	  Some	  political	  activities	  of	  the	  ruling	  party,	  in	  terms	  
of	  attempting	  to	  establish	  control	  over	  the	  state	  administration	  and	  restricting	  the	  activities	  
of	  the	  opposition,	  suggest	  that	  they	  may	  want	  to	  move	  in	  this	  direction.	  But	  there	  are	  
questions	  about	  the	  sustainability	  of	  this	  strategy,	  given	  the	  relatively	  short	  life	  span	  in	  
Bangladesh	  of	  previous	  coalitions	  that	  used	  similar	  strategies	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  	  
In	  a	  second	  scenario,	  the	  political	  settlement	  could	  revert	  back	  towards	  competitive	  
clientelism	  and	  a	  multi-­‐party	  democracy,	  either	  as	  a	  result	  of	  an	  effective	  challenge	  by	  
excluded	  groups	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  divisions	  within	  the	  ruling	  party	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  
both.	  This	  would	  be	  strongly	  resisted	  by	  sections	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  as	  they	  may	  be	  fearful	  of	  
reprisals	  by	  opposition	  parties	  if	  they	  are	  voted	  out	  of	  power,	  as	  the	  opposition	  has	  faced	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repression	  for	  some	  time.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  scenario	  is	  likely	  to	  materialise	  sooner	  or	  later	  
as	  an	  institutional	  equilibrium	  in	  politics	  is	  only	  likely	  in	  Bangladesh	  if	  all	  groups	  have	  a	  
reasonable	  chance	  of	  getting	  to	  power	  through	  competitive	  politics.	  	  
Finally,	  the	  least	  likely	  scenario	  is	  that	  the	  ruling	  Awami	  League	  becomes	  simultaneously	  
much	  more	  inclusive	  (thereby	  reducing	  external	  opposition	  and	  the	  need	  for	  repression)	  and	  
more	  disciplined	  (making	  it	  capable	  of	  implementing	  developmental	  policies).	  In	  this	  
scenario	  the	  Awami	  League	  becomes	  more	  like	  a	  developmental	  party	  like	  Malaysia’s	  
Barisan	  National	  in	  the	  1970s.	  While	  this	  is	  a	  trajectory	  that	  some	  party	  ideologues	  are	  
promoting	  as	  a	  possibility,	  the	  configuration	  of	  power	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  party	  makes	  
this	  the	  least	  likely	  scenario.	  
3.1. From	  dominant	  party	  to	  vulnerable	  authoritarianism:	  
Awami	  League	  1971	  to	  1975	  
The	  Awami	  League	  government	  that	  was	  elected	  in	  what	  was	  East	  Pakistan	  in	  1970	  was	  
enormously	  popular	  and	  was	  initially	  an	  example	  of	  an	  elected	  dominant	  party.	  A	  significant	  
number	  of	  the	  powerful	  groups	  and	  factions	  in	  the	  country	  were	  under	  the	  Awami	  League	  
umbrella	  at	  that	  time,	  united	  in	  their	  determination	  to	  get	  a	  fair	  deal	  for	  Bengalis.	  When	  the	  
West	  Pakistani	  elites	  refused	  to	  accept	  the	  results	  of	  the	  1970	  election	  and	  East	  Pakistan	  
split	  to	  become	  Bangladesh,	  even	  more	  groups	  joined	  the	  Awami	  League.	  It	  was	  a	  classic	  
example	  of	  a	  weak	  dominant	  party	  because	  it	  included	  so	  many	  groups	  that	  it	  faced	  little	  
opposition	  from	  outside,	  but	  its	  very	  size	  and	  complexity	  meant	  that	  the	  leadership	  had	  
limited	  control	  over	  the	  organisation.	  From	  the	  beginning,	  tensions	  began	  to	  rise	  over	  the	  
distribution	  of	  resources	  and	  opportunities,	  and	  some	  groups	  began	  to	  leave	  the	  party	  and	  
set	  up	  counter	  parties	  from	  1972.	  	  
The	  years	  immediately	  after	  1971	  were	  economically	  difficult	  because	  of	  the	  disruption	  and	  
destruction	  caused	  by	  the	  war.	  The	  limited	  industrial	  capabilities	  that	  had	  developed	  in	  
modern	  industry	  were	  mostly	  in	  West	  Pakistani-­‐owned	  firms,	  including	  many	  jute	  mills	  in	  
East	  Pakistan.	  When	  the	  West	  Pakistanis	  left	  in	  1971,	  the	  nationalisation	  of	  these	  assets	  was	  
perhaps	  necessary	  given	  the	  absence	  of	  Bengali	  entrepreneurs	  who	  could	  have	  taken	  over	  
and	  run	  these	  companies.	  But	  the	  government	  went	  beyond	  necessity	  by	  also	  nationalising	  
the	  assets	  of	  Bengali	  capitalists.	  	  
What	  ensued	  was	  a	  period	  of	  unconstrained	  asset	  and	  resource	  grabbing	  by	  party	  members	  
(Islam	  1979:	  225-­‐6).	  This	  was	  a	  version	  of	  political	  corruption,	  but	  on	  a	  bigger	  scale	  than	  is	  
normal	  in	  developing	  countries,	  where	  informal	  resources	  have	  to	  be	  found	  by	  political	  
leaders	  for	  their	  organisers	  and	  supporters.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  independence	  there	  were	  
very	  high	  pent-­‐up	  demands	  of	  organisers	  who	  had	  led	  the	  movement.	  Some	  of	  the	  asset	  
capture	  could	  also	  be	  described	  as	  ‘primitive	  accumulation’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  individuals	  with	  
political	  power	  were	  accumulating	  assets	  through	  these	  means.	  Primitive	  accumulation	  can	  
sometimes	  have	  positive	  outcomes	  if	  it	  results	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  productive	  capitalists,	  
but	  this	  takes	  time	  and	  needs	  additional	  conditions.	  However,	  the	  immediate	  impact	  of	  the	  
corruption	  and	  primitive	  accumulation	  was	  to	  exacerbate	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  war.	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Productivity	  in	  manufacturing	  collapsed	  to	  an	  average	  of	  less	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  level	  
reached	  in	  1970,	  and	  real	  wages	  in	  manufacturing	  to	  around	  60	  percent	  of	  their	  1969/70	  
level	  (World	  Bank	  1978:	  Vol.	  II	  Annex	  I.6	  p.	  173,	  1984:	  Vol.	  II	  Table	  9.12	  p.	  118).	  	  
In	  1974	  Bangladesh	  suffered	  from	  a	  serious	  famine	  that	  took	  place	  without	  any	  significant	  
decline	  in	  aggregate	  food	  availability	  (Sen	  1983).	  The	  causes	  were	  largely	  state	  failure	  in	  
managing	  distribution	  and	  ensuring	  purchasing	  power	  in	  a	  context	  of	  hoarding	  and	  
smuggling.	  More	  than	  a	  million	  people	  died	  in	  the	  famine,	  dissipating	  broad	  support	  for	  the	  
party	  (Sen	  1983:	  134-­‐41;	  Karim	  2005:	  335-­‐40).	  Growth	  collapsed	  to	  -­‐0.1	  percent	  over	  the	  
period,	  partly	  caused	  by	  the	  ravages	  of	  the	  war,	  but	  partly	  also	  compounded	  by	  policy	  
choices	  and	  rent	  management	  failures	  of	  the	  government.	  	  
The	  response	  of	  the	  regime	  to	  the	  growing	  economic	  and	  political	  crisis	  was	  to	  announce	  the	  
formation	  of	  a	  one-­‐party	  state	  and	  to	  ban	  all	  other	  political	  parties	  and	  organisations.	  This	  
attempted	  transition	  to	  a	  vulnerable	  authoritarianism	  did	  not	  prove	  sustainable.	  The	  Awami	  
League	  was	  renamed	  the	  Peasants	  and	  Workers	  Awami	  League	  (BAKSAL).	  Paradoxically,	  the	  
attempt	  was	  not	  to	  exclude	  opposition	  networks	  but	  rather	  to	  force	  them	  to	  join	  an	  inclusive	  
party.	  But	  forced	  inclusion	  does	  not	  create	  an	  inclusive	  party:	  it	  was	  soon	  clear	  that	  the	  
move	  triggered	  strong	  resistance	  that	  would	  have	  required	  repression	  to	  sustain.	  Forced	  
inclusion	  excludes	  many	  organisations	  from	  competing	  for	  rents	  on	  their	  own	  terms	  and	  has	  
to	  be	  enforced	  by	  administrative	  restrictions	  and	  suppression,	  a	  characteristic	  of	  vulnerable	  
authoritarianism.	  For	  existing	  Awami	  Leaguers	  the	  implication	  was	  also	  a	  dilution	  of	  their	  
control	  over	  rents,	  as	  well	  as	  reduced	  bargaining	  power	  with	  the	  leadership,	  as	  they	  would	  
no	  longer	  have	  a	  credible	  threat	  of	  leaving	  the	  party	  (Khan	  2013a).	  To	  be	  sustainable,	  the	  
leadership	  would	  have	  to	  impose	  greater	  discipline	  on	  the	  party	  and	  this	  too	  was	  resisted,	  
making	  the	  move	  towards	  vulnerable	  authoritarianism	  in	  Figure	  7	  particularly	  difficult.	  
Senior	  members	  of	  the	  party	  and	  state	  publicly	  voiced	  approval	  for	  the	  new	  arrangements,	  
but	  their	  subsequent	  actions	  in	  instantly	  supporting	  the	  post-­‐Awami	  League	  regimes	  reveal	  
that	  many	  were	  deeply	  dissatisfied.	  The	  regime	  did	  not	  last	  long	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  
BAKSAL,	  as	  Mujib	  was	  assassinated	  in	  August	  1975.	  	  
3.2. Authoritarian	  clientelism	  and	  the	  gradual	  return	  to	  
democracy	  1975	  to	  1990	  
More	  turbulence	  followed	  the	  assassination	  of	  Mujib,	  with	  coups	  and	  counter-­‐coups,	  till	  
Major-­‐General	  Ziaur	  (Zia)	  Rahman	  became	  chief	  martial	  law	  administrator	  in	  1976,	  and	  
President	  in	  1977.	  Under	  him,	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	  was	  gradually	  restored	  and	  he	  set	  up	  the	  
Bangladesh	  Nationalist	  Party	  (BNP)	  in	  1978.	  By	  allowing	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  other	  parties,	  
including	  the	  Awami	  League	  and	  Islamist	  parties,	  Zia	  was	  able	  to	  reduce	  the	  resistance	  and	  
violence	  coming	  from	  excluded	  organisations.	  The	  party	  he	  built	  was	  based	  on	  absorbing	  
factions	  from	  all	  sides	  and	  this	  meant	  his	  capacity	  to	  discipline	  the	  new	  party	  was	  not	  very	  
high.	  Zia	  himself	  had	  a	  reputation	  for	  integrity,	  but	  the	  BNP	  was	  a	  typical	  clientelist	  party,	  like	  
the	  Awami	  League,	  and	  rent	  distribution	  based	  on	  political	  corruption	  was	  essential	  for	  
maintaining	  the	  organisation.	  A	  form	  of	  competitive	  clientelism	  was	  emerging	  but	  it	  was	  
initially	  constrained	  by	  the	  strong	  rule	  of	  Zia,	  which	  ensured	  that	  while	  factions	  could	  mobilise	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and	  compete	  with	  or	  join	  the	  BNP,	  their	  realistic	  chance	  of	  displacing	  the	  leader	  was	  small.	  
This	  is	  why	  we	  describe	  this	  transitional	  phase	  as	  authoritarian	  clientelism	  in	  Figure	  7.	  	  	  
While	  Zia’s	  new	  party	  was	  weak	  as	  an	  organisation	  for	  policy	  implementation,	  his	  personal	  
charisma	  and	  control	  over	  the	  administration	  allowed	  him	  to	  push	  through	  some	  critical	  
policy	  innovations.	  Nationalisation	  and	  the	  ‘socialist’	  planning	  that	  had	  been	  introduced	  
under	  the	  Awami	  League	  began	  to	  be	  reversed.	  In	  particular,	  he	  oversaw	  and	  enabled	  the	  
Desh-­‐Daewoo	  partnership	  that	  brought	  the	  modern	  garments	  and	  textile	  industry	  to	  
Bangladesh.	  Its	  entry	  was	  based	  on	  enabling	  a	  new	  type	  of	  industrial	  policy	  that	  passed	  on	  
some	  of	  the	  ‘quota	  rents’	  created	  for	  Bangladesh	  by	  the	  MFA	  to	  a	  foreign	  technology	  
provider,	  Daewoo,	  to	  induce	  them	  to	  transfer	  organisational	  and	  technical	  capabilities	  to	  a	  
Bangladeshi-­‐owned	  firm,	  Desh	  (Rhee	  1990;	  Khan	  2013b,	  2015).	  Once	  Desh	  had	  acquired	  
these	  capabilities,	  it	  did	  not	  stop	  its	  managers	  from	  migrating	  and	  setting	  up	  their	  own	  firms,	  
allowing	  rapid	  growth	  through	  imitation	  and	  clustering.	  Desh	  did	  not	  resist	  imitation	  
because	  it	  saw	  the	  advantages	  of	  clustering	  that	  attracted	  a	  steady	  stream	  of	  orders	  and	  
buyers.	  	  
Zia	  was	  a	  popular	  war	  hero,	  but	  he	  too	  was	  assassinated	  in	  1981	  by	  dissidents	  within	  the	  army.	  
His	  successor,	  General	  Ershad	  was	  much	  less	  popular.	  He	  was	  also	  personally	  corrupt,	  
popularly	  reputed	  to	  take	  a	  10	  percent	  cut	  on	  all	  projects.	  During	  his	  rule,	  opposition	  political	  
parties	  consolidated	  their	  power	  and	  demanded	  that	  he	  step	  down	  so	  that	  they	  would	  have	  a	  
real	  chance	  of	  winning.	  This	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  realisation	  in	  Bangladesh	  (a	  realisation	  
shared	  by	  both	  the	  Awami	  League	  and	  the	  BNP	  at	  the	  time)	  that	  it	  was	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  
defeat	  a	  sitting	  government	  in	  an	  election,	  while	  it	  controls	  the	  administration.	  The	  incumbent	  
does	  not	  have	  to	  stuff	  ballot	  boxes	  (though	  that	  occasionally	  happens).	  There	  are	  many	  
different	  infractions	  including	  policing	  delays	  in	  particular	  areas,	  and	  obstructions	  and	  
intimidation	  of	  some	  voters	  that	  collectively	  mean	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  oust	  an	  incumbent	  in	  
elections,	  a	  problem	  that	  remains	  to	  this	  day.	  Ershad’s	  refusal	  to	  stand	  down	  resulted	  in	  
political	  violence	  and	  instability	  that	  led	  to	  the	  decline	  in	  private	  investment	  that	  we	  discussed	  
in	  Section	  2.	  The	  fall	  of	  his	  regime	  brought	  about	  the	  innovation	  of	  a	  ‘Caretaker	  Government’	  
an	  electoral	  arrangement	  that	  set	  up	  a	  neutral	  administration	  to	  organise	  the	  elections	  and	  
hand	  power	  over	  to	  the	  winner.	  The	  next	  fifteen	  years	  saw	  repeated	  transfers	  of	  power	  in	  
elections	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this	  innovation	  becoming	  institutionalised	  in	  1996.	  	  
3.3. Competitive	  clientelism	  and	  democracy	  1990	  to	  2006:	  
growth	  and	  the	  Bangladesh	  paradox	  	  
The	  transition	  to	  democracy	  in	  Bangladesh	  brought	  about	  political	  peace	  because	  the	  
configuration	  of	  power	  between	  and	  across	  political	  organisations	  was	  reflected	  in	  political	  
institutions	  that	  gave	  all	  powerful	  groups	  a	  realistic	  chance	  of	  getting	  to	  power	  and	  accessing	  
rents.	  Excluded	  organisations	  were	  strong,	  but	  as	  they	  perceived	  they	  had	  a	  chance	  of	  
getting	  back	  to	  power	  through	  elections,	  other	  forms	  of	  competition	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  
violence	  remained	  relatively	  limited.	  However,	  limited	  does	  not	  mean	  absent.	  There	  were	  
frequent	  episodes	  of	  violent	  confrontations	  between	  the	  two	  major	  parties:	  the	  BNP	  and	  the	  
Awami	  League.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  elections	  were	  sufficiently	  well	  managed	  by	  the	  Caretaker	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System	  of	  conducting	  elections,	  formally	  introduced	  through	  the	  13th	  Amendment	  to	  the	  
Constitution	  in	  1996.	  Nevertheless,	  political	  parties	  had	  short	  time	  horizons	  and	  the	  
competitive	  political	  structure	  meant	  that	  leaders	  found	  it	  hard	  to	  discipline	  their	  
organisations	  and	  could	  only	  keep	  them	  together	  with	  generous	  internal	  rent	  allocations.	  
Political	  corruption	  was	  paradoxically	  even	  higher	  than	  under	  the	  egregious	  Ershad,	  to	  the	  
surprise	  of	  many	  democracy	  campaigners	  who	  had	  hoped	  that	  democracy	  would	  result	  in	  a	  
reduction	  of	  corruption.	  The	  real	  advantage	  of	  democracy	  was	  in	  achieving	  stability	  and	  
reducing	  the	  conflicts	  between	  competing	  coalitions	  of	  factions.	  Private	  investments	  shot	  
up,	  beyond	  the	  levels	  that	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  the	  authoritarian	  Ershad	  regime,	  largely	  
because	  of	  a	  more	  predictable	  long-­‐term	  strategy	  through	  which	  the	  private	  sector	  could	  
protect	  its	  interests	  by	  doing	  deals	  with	  the	  two	  main	  parties.	  
The	  high	  growth	  during	  the	  democratic	  period	  in	  Bangladesh	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  
combination	  of	  three	  factors.	  First,	  greater	  political	  stability	  was	  beneficial	  for	  supporting	  
investments	  in	  sectors	  that	  were	  already	  competitive.	  This	  would	  not,	  however,	  have	  been	  
sufficient	  without	  a	  second	  critical	  factor:	  the	  prior	  existence	  of	  a	  number	  of	  competitive	  
sectors,	  both	  in	  industry	  and	  agriculture.	  These	  sectors	  included	  garments	  and	  a	  few	  others,	  
like	  basic	  pharmaceuticals.	  Stability	  without	  competitiveness	  would	  not	  have	  worked.	  In	  
addition,	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  sectors	  with	  simple	  technologies	  where	  organisational	  
learning	  was	  not	  difficult.	  These	  included	  sectors	  like	  poultry,	  shrimp	  and	  fish	  farming,	  and	  
food	  products.	  Businesses	  entering	  these	  types	  of	  sectors	  could	  expect	  to	  rapidly	  establish	  
the	  local	  political	  and	  bureaucratic	  connections	  necessary	  for	  doing	  business.	  Finally,	  
political	  competition	  created	  a	  perception	  of	  safety	  from	  excessive	  rent	  extraction.	  If	  a	  
government	  was	  becoming	  too	  extractive,	  businesses	  could	  threaten	  to	  switch	  support	  to	  
the	  opposition.	  Perhaps	  for	  this	  reason,	  both	  major	  political	  parties	  continued	  to	  be	  
business-­‐friendly,	  and	  both	  had	  a	  live-­‐and-­‐let-­‐live	  attitude	  to	  businesses,	  regardless	  of	  the	  
parties	  they	  supported.	  Businesses	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  current	  ruling	  party	  were	  
likely	  to	  be	  somewhat	  more	  privileged,	  but	  other	  businesses	  were	  not	  destroyed	  and	  could	  
wait	  for	  a	  change	  in	  government	  to	  get	  better	  opportunities.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  were	  serious	  problems	  of	  governance	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  close	  
links	  between	  business	  and	  politics	  were	  often	  problematic.	  Many	  entrepreneurs	  began	  to	  
stand	  for	  and	  win	  elections	  with	  party	  tickets	  and	  many	  became	  party	  financiers.	  By	  the	  late	  
1990s,	  the	  majority	  of	  parliamentarians	  described	  themselves	  as	  businessmen	  or	  women.	  As	  
we	  would	  expect	  in	  these	  contexts	  of	  informality	  and	  personalised	  relationships,	  the	  
businessmen	  in	  politics	  did	  not	  represent	  collective	  business	  interests,	  but	  rather	  their	  own	  
interests	  in	  capturing	  rents.	  The	  greater	  participation	  of	  businesses	  in	  politics	  therefore	  did	  not	  
result	  in	  better	  public	  goods	  for	  the	  private	  sector,	  better	  regulation,	  or	  developmental	  policies	  
or	  rules-­‐based	  governance.	  Instead,	  it	  resulted	  in	  greater	  competition	  for	  rents	  between	  the	  
parties	  based	  on	  increased	  investments	  in	  rent-­‐seeking,	  and	  a	  consequent	  worsening	  of	  some	  
developmental	  outcomes.	  
This	  political	  context	  described	  above	  did	  not	  support	  the	  credibility	  of	  long-­‐term	  
contracting,	  particularly	  between	  governments	  and	  domestic	  investors.	  Foreign	  investors	  
were	  somewhat	  better	  off	  because	  their	  investments	  were	  often	  protected	  by	  sovereign	  
guarantees,	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  power	  sector.	  There	  were	  only	  two	  major	  private	  sector	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investments	  in	  power	  generation	  between	  1990	  and	  2006,	  and	  both	  were	  by	  foreign	  
companies.	  The	  Haripur	  and	  Meghnaghat	  1	  power	  plants	  became	  operational	  in	  2001	  and	  
2002	  respectively,	  with	  significant	  World	  Bank	  funding	  or	  World	  Bank	  Partial	  Risk	  
Guarantees.	  Both	  investments	  were	  led	  by	  the	  US	  company	  AES	  (Allied	  Energy	  Systems)	  and	  
contracted	  to	  sell	  electricity	  at	  very	  competitive	  prices	  in	  plants	  that	  are	  still	  operational.	  
Both	  were	  later	  owned	  and	  operated	  by	  the	  Malaysian	  company	  Pendekar	  Energy.	  No	  
further	  private	  investments	  of	  any	  significance	  were	  forthcoming	  over	  the	  next	  six	  years,	  
resulting	  in	  growing	  power	  shortages1.	  	  
Political	  stability	  also	  began	  to	  fray	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period	  as	  the	  competition	  
between	  the	  two	  parties	  became	  more	  fraught.	  During	  the	  last	  BNP	  government	  there	  was	  a	  
grenade	  attack	  in	  August	  2004	  on	  a	  rally	  attended	  by	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  opposition	  Awami	  
League	  causing	  the	  deaths	  of	  24	  people.	  In	  2005	  the	  Awami	  League’s	  ex-­‐Minister	  of	  Finance	  
was	  assassinated.	  The	  investigations	  into	  these	  incidents	  by	  the	  BNP	  were	  not	  sufficiently	  
robust	  and	  did	  not	  satisfy	  the	  Awami	  League.	  The	  failure	  of	  politics	  in	  Bangladesh	  was	  that	  
the	  live-­‐and-­‐let-­‐live	  principles	  on	  which	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  rules	  for	  rent	  allocation	  
were	  based	  could	  not	  be	  sustained.	  	  
On	  most	  measures	  of	  governance	  quality,	  Bangladesh	  fared	  poorly	  or	  even	  retrogressed	  
during	  the	  democratic	  period.	  Corruption	  was	  high	  and	  generally	  increasing,	  there	  was	  
creeping	  politicisation	  of	  the	  administration	  that	  got	  worse	  with	  every	  successive	  
government	  and	  the	  formal	  institutionalisation	  of	  rules	  proved	  to	  be	  difficult.	  Political	  
violence	  also	  crept	  up	  gradually.	  Ultimately,	  the	  failure	  to	  institutionalise	  and	  follow	  the	  
critically	  important	  electoral	  rules	  of	  the	  caretaker	  system	  led	  to	  the	  emergency	  of	  11	  
January	  2007.	  The	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  therefore	  provides	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  
‘Bangladesh	  paradox’	  but	  also	  suggests	  why	  the	  paradox	  could	  not	  last	  forever.	  The	  
economic	  challenges	  for	  Bangladesh	  going	  into	  the	  future	  remain:	  how	  to	  develop	  new	  
sectors	  and	  to	  increase	  productivity	  and	  diversification,	  and	  how	  to	  encourage	  long-­‐term	  
investments	  (Khan	  2013a).	  Even	  if	  competitive	  clientelism	  had	  continued,	  the	  challenge	  of	  
addressing	  some	  of	  the	  governance	  failures	  affecting	  productivity	  growth	  would	  have	  
emerged.	  	  
3.4. Return	  to	  single-­‐party	  rule:	  towards	  a	  new	  vulnerable	  
authoritarianism	  2008–?	  
After	  the	  two-­‐year	  Emergency	  that	  followed	  the	  breakdown	  of	  elections	  in	  2006,	  elections	  in	  
2008	  brought	  the	  Awami	  League	  back	  to	  power.	  The	  Emergency	  was	  a	  period	  of	  lost	  
opportunities,	  because	  policy-­‐makers	  during	  this	  period	  attempted	  to	  introduce	  ‘good	  
governance’	  and	  eliminate	  corruption	  in	  general.	  Instead,	  a	  more	  politically	  astute	  approach	  
would	  have	  focused	  on	  implementable	  reforms	  that	  addressed	  some	  of	  the	  most	  damaging	  
	  
1	  Some	  commentators	  have	  jumped	  from	  the	  observation	  that	  a	  few	  businesses	  did	  make	  long-­‐term	  investments	  (and	  were	  
thus	  able	  to	  deal	  with	  both	  parties)	  to	  the	  erroneous	  conclusion	  that	  contract	  enforcement	  in	  general	  was	  not	  a	  problem	  
constraining	  long-­‐term	  investments	  (Hassan	  2013:	  23-­‐4).	  The	  negligible	  scale	  of	  private	  domestic	  investments	  in	  the	  power	  
sector	  over	  this	  period	  falsifies	  this	  claim.	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types	  of	  corruption.	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  Emergency	  period	  reforms	  and	  the	  return	  to	  
democracy	  could	  have	  marked	  a	  return	  to	  competitive	  clientelism,	  but	  it	  soon	  became	  clear	  
that	  the	  new	  ruling	  party,	  the	  Awami	  League,	  was	  intent	  on	  changing	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  
to	  ensure	  the	  opposition	  could	  not	  win	  the	  next	  election.	  Its	  strategy	  included	  reducing	  the	  
organisational	  freedoms	  of	  opposition	  parties	  and	  changing	  the	  electoral	  laws	  by	  abolishing	  
the	  Caretaker	  System	  in	  2011,	  through	  the	  Fifteenth	  Amendment	  to	  the	  Constitution.	  This	  
significantly	  reduced	  the	  credibility	  of	  elections	  and	  unleashed	  serious	  conflicts	  and	  
uncertainty.	  The	  2008	  Awami	  League	  was	  therefore	  already	  positioning	  itself	  to	  take	  on	  the	  
opposition	  using	  administrative	  and	  policing	  methods:	  for	  this	  reason	  in	  Figure	  7	  we	  locate	  it	  
as	  moving	  towards	  vulnerable	  authoritarianism.	  	  
Despite	  intense	  and	  violent	  opposition	  and	  a	  boycott	  of	  the	  elections	  by	  the	  opposition	  BNP,	  
the	  government	  moved	  ahead	  with	  the	  2014	  elections.	  The	  2014	  Awami	  League	  government	  
was	  effectively	  an	  unelected	  government,	  as	  more	  than	  half	  the	  seats	  in	  parliament	  were	  
uncontested	  and	  no	  election	  was	  held	  in	  these	  seats.	  In	  the	  rest,	  the	  competing	  candidates	  
were	  all	  members	  of	  the	  Awami	  League	  or	  its	  close	  allies.	  The	  2014	  Awami	  League	  
government	  therefore	  began	  life	  with	  a	  low	  level	  of	  legitimacy.	  The	  suppression	  of	  the	  
opposition	  has	  been	  quite	  systematic	  and	  has	  raised	  questions	  about	  the	  sustainability	  of	  
these	  political	  arrangements.	  We	  have	  already	  seen	  in	  Section	  2	  the	  dampening	  effects	  of	  
political	  uncertainty	  on	  private	  investments.	  
The	  single-­‐party	  rule	  that	  has	  emerged	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  administration	  in	  the	  country	  probably	  
does	  not	  reflect	  a	  real	  change	  in	  the	  latent	  power	  of	  underlying	  political	  networks	  in	  the	  
country.	  It	  is	  more	  plausibly	  the	  result	  of	  an	  effective	  deployment	  of	  administrative	  power	  and	  
political	  strategies	  of	  delegitimising	  and	  blocking	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  opposition.	  This	  has	  been	  
effective	  for	  a	  while,	  but	  its	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	  must	  be	  questionable.	  The	  post-­‐2014	  
Awami	  League	  is	  therefore	  not	  a	  dominant	  party	  like	  the	  1971	  Awami	  League,	  and	  is	  more	  
accurately	  described	  as	  a	  vulnerable	  authoritarianism.	  While	  it	  clearly	  enjoys	  the	  support	  of	  its	  
core	  constituency,	  its	  stay	  in	  power	  has	  depended	  on	  not	  allowing	  elections	  under	  the	  only	  set	  
of	  rules	  that	  have	  actually	  worked	  in	  changing	  governments	  in	  Bangladesh.	  The	  interesting	  
question	  is	  how	  this	  new	  configuration	  of	  power	  is	  likely	  to	  evolve	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  
In	  Figure	  7	  we	  suggested	  three	  possible	  alternative	  scenarios	  over	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  The	  
first	  is	  a	  consolidation	  of	  the	  current	  strategy	  of	  the	  ruling	  party.	  If	  the	  Awami	  League	  
intends	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  by	  continuing	  to	  reject	  demands	  for	  a	  neutral	  administration	  to	  
organise	  elections,	  it	  will	  have	  to	  become	  more	  effective	  and	  disciplined	  in	  dealing	  with	  
concerted	  opposition	  over	  time.	  The	  success	  of	  this	  strategy	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  emergence	  
of	  a	  more	  ‘authoritarian’	  party.	  Such	  a	  party	  will	  still	  be	  vulnerable	  because	  it	  will	  have	  to	  
continuously	  confront	  opposition,	  perhaps	  from	  new	  sources.	  There	  are	  signs	  of	  growing	  
internal	  conflicts	  within	  the	  Awami	  League	  and	  the	  party	  is	  unlikely	  to	  remain	  sufficiently	  
disciplined	  to	  make	  this	  scenario	  viable	  in	  the	  longer	  term.	  Newspaper	  reports	  suggest	  
sustained	  and	  growing	  violence,	  often	  lethal,	  between	  competing	  factions	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  
over	  contracts	  and	  positions.	  Imposing	  discipline	  on	  such	  a	  party	  may	  not	  be	  easy.	  But	  if	  the	  
party	  is	  internally	  divided,	  its	  capacity	  to	  take	  on	  and	  resist	  growing	  opposition	  may	  be	  
compromised.	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Moreover,	  in	  an	  unexpected	  challenge	  to	  its	  strategy	  of	  politicising	  the	  administration,	  the	  
judicial	  branch	  struck	  down	  the	  Sixteenth	  Amendment	  to	  the	  constitution	  (which	  allowed	  
parliament	  to	  impeach	  judges	  deemed	  to	  be	  ‘incapable’	  using	  a	  two-­‐thirds	  majority)	  passed	  
by	  the	  Awami	  League	  in	  September	  2014.	  As	  the	  Awami	  League	  and	  its	  allies	  control	  
parliament	  after	  the	  uncontested	  2014	  elections,	  this	  would	  have	  institutionalised	  party	  
control	  over	  the	  judiciary.	  The	  High	  Court	  declared	  the	  amendment	  illegal	  in	  May	  2016,	  and	  
a	  government	  appeal	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  was	  defeated	  in	  July	  2017.	  This	  has	  opened	  up	  a	  
new	  front	  in	  the	  government’s	  attempts	  to	  establish	  control	  over	  the	  administration.	  
Immediately	  after	  the	  verdict,	  the	  government	  made	  clear	  that	  it	  disagrees	  with	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  and	  will	  attempt	  to	  by-­‐pass	  the	  verdict.	  If	  it	  does,	  this	  too	  will	  be	  a	  point	  of	  
conflict	  with	  uncertain	  long-­‐term	  consequences.	  Finally,	  if	  the	  uncertainty	  continues	  and	  
investor	  confidence	  suffers	  much	  more,	  economics	  will	  kick	  in	  to	  make	  the	  scenario	  
unsustainable.	  The	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	  of	  the	  first	  scenario	  is	  therefore	  questionable	  
given	  these	  economic,	  political	  and	  administrative	  constraints.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  political	  
determination	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  to	  go	  in	  this	  direction	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  a	  50	  
percent	  probability	  that	  some	  variant	  of	  this	  scenario	  will	  persist	  in	  the	  medium	  term.	  	  
The	  second	  scenario	  is	  a	  return	  to	  democracy	  of	  a	  competitive	  clientelist	  variety.	  This	  is	  likely	  
to	  be	  a	  more	  sustainable	  outcome	  over	  time,	  but	  the	  transition	  has	  become	  increasingly	  
difficult	  and	  an	  immediate	  transition	  does	  not	  appear	  very	  likely.	  A	  necessary	  condition	  
would	  be	  the	  emergence	  of	  credible	  election	  arrangements,	  such	  that	  the	  winner	  of	  the	  
election	  was	  perceived	  to	  actually	  have	  more	  popular	  support	  and	  therefore	  legitimacy	  as	  
the	  winner.	  This	  is	  unlikely	  to	  happen	  without	  popular	  mobilisation	  for	  a	  change	  in	  electoral	  
rules	  back	  towards	  something	  like	  the	  caretaker	  system.	  But	  such	  a	  mobilisation	  is	  difficult	  in	  
the	  presence	  of	  significant	  political	  control	  over	  the	  police	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  
administration,	  even	  though	  some	  aspects	  of	  political	  control	  are	  fraying.	  While	  some	  form	  
of	  competitive	  clientelism	  is	  likely	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  best	  feasible	  conditions	  for	  long-­‐term	  
stability	  and	  private	  sector	  investments	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Bangladesh,	  the	  political	  strategy	  of	  
the	  ruling	  party	  currently	  gives	  this	  scenario	  no	  more	  than	  a	  40	  percent	  chance	  of	  
materialising	  in	  the	  medium	  term.	  	  
A	  third	  scenario	  is	  that	  the	  Awami	  League	  becomes	  a	  developmental	  party.	  This	  would	  be	  a	  
desirable	  outcome,	  but	  is	  the	  least	  likely	  one	  given	  that	  this	  would	  require	  the	  ruling	  party	  to	  
become	  not	  only	  more	  disciplined	  but	  also	  more	  inclusive,	  to	  reduce	  the	  necessity	  of	  using	  
administrative	  mechanisms	  for	  limiting	  opposition.	  Achieving	  greater	  inclusion	  through	  a	  
voluntary	  process	  is	  very	  difficult	  in	  the	  Bangladeshi	  context	  as	  the	  history	  of	  BAKSAL	  in	  1975	  
shows.	  The	  political	  networks	  that	  are	  against	  the	  Awami	  League	  have	  deep	  ideological	  
differences	  with	  it	  and,	  in	  addition,	  many	  have	  experienced	  harsh	  repression	  in	  the	  recent	  
past	  which	  they	  are	  unlikely	  to	  forget.	  In	  the	  current	  context	  of	  Bangladesh	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  
imagine	  a	  viable	  strategy	  through	  which	  the	  Awami	  League	  could	  absorb	  enough	  of	  the	  
opposition	  to	  allow	  it	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  without	  administrative	  limits	  on	  political	  activity	  or	  
even	  repression.	  While	  some	  Awami	  League	  supporters	  have	  been	  promoting	  the	  
construction	  of	  a	  developmental	  party	  that	  provides	  ‘development	  first	  and	  democracy	  
later’,	  the	  realistic	  possibility	  of	  such	  an	  outcome	  materialising	  in	  the	  configuration	  of	  power	  
in	  Bangladesh	  is	  not	  more	  than	  5	  percent.	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Other	  alternatives	  like	  a	  military	  coup	  are	  not	  likely	  in	  the	  current	  political	  situation.	  The	  
army	  appears	  to	  be	  content	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  the	  political	  fray	  and	  that	  is	  in	  any	  case	  a	  desirable	  
outcome	  for	  political	  development	  in	  Bangladesh.	  However,	  given	  that	  legitimate	  elections	  
appear	  to	  be	  unlikely	  in	  the	  near	  future,	  one	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  unpredictable	  black	  swan	  
events	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out	  in	  this	  uncertain	  political	  context,	  even	  though	  they	  appear	  to	  
have	  low	  probability	  or	  feasibility	  at	  the	  moment.	  	  	  
The	  economic	  and	  political	  outcomes	  that	  we	  observe	  in	  contemporary	  Bangladesh	  are	  
therefore	  consistent	  with	  a	  direction	  of	  travel	  towards	  a	  vulnerable	  authoritarianism.	  In	  
some	  respects,	  governance	  capabilities	  appear	  to	  have	  declined	  relative	  to	  the	  democratic	  
period.	  The	  impunity	  and	  politicisation	  of	  law-­‐enforcement	  officers	  appears	  to	  have	  
increased.	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  higher	  levels	  of	  corruption	  in	  banking	  and	  other	  sectors	  that	  
are	  not	  satisfactorily	  investigated	  despite	  repeated	  media	  exposures	  of	  large	  scale	  scams.	  
There	  is	  a	  creeping	  growth	  in	  political	  violence	  and	  the	  growing	  politicisation	  of	  all	  branches	  
of	  government	  (Transparency	  International	  Bangladesh	  2014).	  If	  the	  government	  eventually	  
wins	  its	  battle	  with	  the	  judiciary	  over	  the	  Sixteenth	  Amendment,	  it	  will	  be	  able	  to	  politicise	  
the	  judiciary	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  extent.	  The	  possible	  exception	  to	  this	  story	  of	  poor	  
development	  outcomes	  is	  an	  increase	  in	  investments	  in	  power	  generation	  and	  
infrastructure,	  discussed	  below,	  even	  though	  some	  of	  these	  investments	  are	  relatively	  
inefficient	  ones.	  Despite	  these	  areas	  of	  relative	  success,	  the	  general	  impression	  is	  one	  of	  
governance	  facing	  substantial	  implementation	  and	  enforcement	  problems.	  This	  is	  consistent	  
with	  short	  time	  horizons	  of	  investors	  and	  politicians,	  and	  inadequate	  levels	  of	  control	  by	  the	  
political	  leadership	  over	  their	  party	  organisation.	  	  	  
The	  weak	  disciplining	  of	  big	  business	  is	  one	  example	  of	  the	  problem.	  A	  number	  of	  big	  
business	  houses	  have	  had	  significant	  problems	  with	  servicing	  large	  loans.	  These	  problems	  
can	  occasionally	  emerge	  without	  any	  cronyism,	  and	  restructuring	  and	  rescheduling	  of	  large	  
loans	  is	  sometimes	  necessary.	  However,	  a	  distinctive	  characteristic	  of	  developmental	  states	  
is	  that	  occasional	  loan	  restructuring	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  assistance	  are	  combined	  with	  the	  
imposition	  of	  conditions	  that	  the	  investor	  has	  to	  meet	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  requisite	  
improvements	  in	  productivity	  and	  competitiveness	  are	  achieved.	  Otherwise	  the	  rescheduling	  
of	  loans	  is	  likely	  to	  require	  further	  rescheduling	  in	  the	  future,	  at	  a	  higher	  cost	  in	  terms	  of	  lost	  
resources.	  While	  small	  borrowers	  face	  very	  hard	  conditions	  when	  they	  request	  rescheduling,	  
large	  politically	  connected	  business	  houses	  in	  Bangladesh	  are	  often	  given	  very	  easy	  
rescheduling	  terms	  that	  are	  unlikely	  to	  result	  in	  productive	  outcomes.	  	  
In	  2014,	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  politically	  connected	  business	  groups,	  Beximco,	  asked	  for	  almost	  
US$	  700	  million	  of	  non-­‐performing	  loans	  to	  be	  rescheduled.	  A	  restructuring	  of	  US$	  130	  million	  
was	  almost	  immediately	  agreed	  by	  Sonali	  Bank,	  followed	  by	  US$	  240	  million	  rescheduling	  by	  
Janata	  Bank.	  Not	  only	  that,	  Beximco	  was	  granted	  a	  two	  year	  repayment	  holiday	  and	  it	  would	  
then	  enjoy	  an	  interest	  rate	  two	  to	  three	  percent	  lower	  than	  the	  market	  rate	  (Daily	  Star	  15	  
December	  2014:	  Tk.	  1.849cr	  Beximco	  Loans	  Rescheduled).	  Beximco	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  getting	  
sweet	  deals	  that	  more	  productive	  smaller	  companies	  could	  not	  hope	  for.	  Nine	  of	  the	  biggest	  
business	  groups	  with	  similar	  political	  connections	  asked	  for	  loan	  rescheduling	  amounting	  to	  
US$	  1.8	  billion.	  Here	  was	  an	  opportunity	  that	  an	  aspiring	  developmental	  party	  may	  have	  
seized	  on	  to	  impose	  conditions	  for	  greater	  productivity	  and	  competitiveness	  over	  time.	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Instead,	  the	  poor	  performers	  were	  only	  requested	  to	  meet	  their	  restructured	  repayments.	  
These	  examples	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  more	  pessimistic	  scenario	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  
vulnerable	  authoritarianism	  with	  short	  time	  horizons	  and	  low	  enforcement	  capacities,	  rather	  
than	  an	  emerging	  developmental	  coalition	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  type.	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  asset	  owners	  appear	  to	  be	  increasingly	  concerned	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  their	  
assets	  in	  such	  a	  context.	  There	  are	  worrying	  trends	  of	  accelerating	  capital	  flight	  to	  safe	  
havens	  abroad.	  Recorded	  deposits	  of	  Bangladeshis	  in	  Swiss	  banks	  were	  reported	  to	  have	  
doubled	  in	  two	  years,	  from	  258	  million	  dollars	  in	  2012	  to	  550	  million	  dollars	  in	  2014	  (Daily	  
Star	  21	  June	  2015:	  Eyes	  Abroad).	  If	  we	  had	  figures	  for	  flight	  to	  all	  havens,	  including	  
unrecorded	  flows,	  the	  capital	  flight	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  several	  billions	  of	  dollars	  since	  2012.	  The	  
Global	  Financial	  Integrity	  Report	  of	  2015	  suggests	  that	  illicit	  capital	  flight	  from	  Bangladesh	  
increased	  from	  US$	  5.4	  billion	  in	  2010,	  to	  US$	  7.2	  billion	  in	  2012	  and	  US$	  9,666	  million	  in	  
2013	  (Kar	  and	  Spanjers	  2015:	  Appendix	  Table	  3).	  The	  absolute	  numbers	  in	  the	  report	  are	  
estimates	  based	  on	  specific	  methodologies,	  but	  all	  the	  evidence	  points	  to	  a	  significant	  
growth	  in	  illicit	  flows	  from	  Bangladesh	  over	  this	  period.	  	  
The	  Bangladesh	  Bank	  has	  also	  expressed	  concern	  at	  the	  unusually	  high	  figures	  for	  machinery	  
imports	  in	  2015,	  in	  a	  context	  of	  suppressed	  private	  investment	  overall.	  The	  Governor	  of	  the	  
Bank	  raised	  the	  possibility	  that	  machinery	  imports	  were	  being	  over-­‐invoiced	  to	  illegally	  
transfer	  capital	  out	  of	  the	  country	  (The	  Guardian	  Bangladesh	  26	  May	  2015:	  Capital	  
Machinery	  Imports:	  BB	  checking	  banks’	  BoE	  to	  unearth	  capital	  flight).	  The	  many	  dimensions	  
of	  this	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  private	  investment	  slowdown	  may	  be	  more	  than	  a	  
temporary	  blip,	  and	  may	  reflect	  a	  more	  persistent	  problem	  of	  confidence	  leading	  to	  the	  
withdrawal	  of	  capital	  from	  the	  country.	  The	  dynamics	  of	  business-­‐government	  relations	  and	  
private	  sector	  investments	  will	  be	  important	  to	  track	  in	  the	  future.	  Business	  confidence	  
could	  return	  if	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  opposition	  was	  temporarily	  not	  in	  a	  condition	  to	  pose	  
any	  challenge	  to	  its	  exclusion,	  but	  this	  too	  could	  be	  reversed	  once	  excluded	  groups	  began	  to	  
mobilise	  in	  new	  ways.	  	  
Two	  areas	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  general	  story	  of	  poor	  resource	  
management	  are	  electricity	  generation	  and	  some	  infrastructure	  investments.	  Investments	  in	  
infrastructure	  have	  significantly	  increased	  but	  cost	  inflation	  has	  also	  been	  very	  high,	  so	  that	  
the	  real	  increase	  has	  been	  much	  lower	  than	  the	  nominal	  increase.	  The	  story	  in	  the	  power	  
sector	  is	  only	  marginally	  better.	  After	  2009	  there	  has	  been	  a	  rapid	  growth	  in	  generation	  
capacity	  but	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  increase	  has	  come	  from	  the	  commissioning	  of	  peaking	  power	  
plants	  also	  known	  as	  quick	  rental	  plants.	  The	  unit	  cost	  of	  generating	  electricity	  is	  
considerably	  higher	  in	  these	  smaller	  plants	  (up	  to	  five	  to	  six	  times	  higher	  per	  MW	  compared	  
to	  larger	  plants),	  partly	  because	  they	  use	  more	  expensive	  fuels	  like	  furnace	  oil.	  There	  were	  
often	  no	  bidding	  processes	  through	  which	  the	  contracts	  were	  allocated,	  and	  no	  
transparency.	  The	  high	  costs	  of	  these	  power	  generation	  projects	  were	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  
exchequer,	  because	  power	  was	  being	  distributed	  to	  consumers	  at	  a	  much	  lower	  price.	  
Parliament	  also	  passed	  a	  law	  indemnifying	  the	  granting	  of	  these	  contracts	  from	  prosecution	  
(Shah	  2014:	  6).	  The	  legal	  status	  of	  this	  indemnity	  is	  questionable	  once	  the	  government	  
changes,	  but	  it	  does	  suggest	  that	  because	  the	  contracts	  were	  more	  than	  usually	  attractive	  
and	  were	  often	  allocated	  without	  bidding,	  the	  indemnity	  was	  required	  to	  protect	  investors	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and	  the	  government	  from	  challenges	  in	  court	  during	  the	  lifetime	  of	  this	  government.	  These	  
lucrative	  contracts	  did	  attract	  investments	  by	  both	  Bangladeshi	  and	  foreign	  firms	  and	  began	  
to	  make	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  very	  severe	  energy	  shortage	  in	  the	  country.	  However,	  the	  social	  
cost	  of	  generating	  power	  in	  very	  expensive	  ways	  has	  been	  rising.	  Currently,	  around	  half	  a	  
billion	  to	  one	  billion	  dollars	  (depending	  on	  the	  price	  of	  imported	  fuels)	  have	  to	  be	  
transferred	  every	  year	  from	  the	  government’s	  budget	  to	  the	  Bangladesh	  Power	  
Development	  Board	  to	  pay	  for	  these	  expensive	  power	  supply	  contracts.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  
route	  to	  expanding	  power	  supplies	  is	  not	  very	  sustainable.	  	  
However,	  some	  efficient	  investments	  have	  also	  taken	  place	  in	  bigger	  power	  projects	  like	  
Meghnaghat	  2	  and	  Bibiyana,	  led	  by	  companies	  like	  Summit	  Power.	  Meghnaghat	  2	  became	  
operational	  in	  late	  2015.	  The	  credibility	  of	  complex	  long-­‐term	  international	  contracts	  was	  
crucial	  to	  the	  success	  of	  these	  bigger	  ventures,	  as	  was	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  promoters	  to	  raise	  
capital	  relatively	  cheaply	  in	  international	  capital	  markets.	  In	  Meghnaghat	  2,	  for	  example,	  the	  
turbines	  come	  from	  the	  American	  company	  GE,	  the	  plant	  was	  constructed	  by	  a	  Chinese	  
company,	  the	  management	  and	  operation	  will	  be	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  South	  Korean	  company	  
for	  a	  period	  of	  several	  years,	  while	  the	  Bangladeshi	  sponsor,	  Summit,	  organised	  the	  finances	  
from	  domestic	  and	  international	  sources	  and	  will	  eventually	  take	  over	  the	  operation.	  
Contracts	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  gas	  and	  fuel	  and	  for	  the	  purchase	  of	  the	  power	  produced	  are	  
with	  Bangladeshi	  public	  sector	  organisations.	  The	  capability	  of	  companies	  like	  Summit	  to	  
raise	  money	  in	  international	  markets	  for	  long-­‐term	  power	  projects	  has	  depended	  on	  their	  
size	  and	  asset	  base,	  and	  their	  close	  connections	  to	  the	  government.	  There	  are	  very	  few	  
Bangladeshi	  companies	  with	  this	  mix	  of	  characteristics	  and	  this	  has	  constrained	  efficient	  
investment	  in	  these	  complex	  long-­‐run	  projects.	  They	  also	  require	  a	  level	  of	  credibility	  of	  
complex	  contracts,	  as	  many	  different	  parties	  have	  to	  feel	  assured	  about	  their	  liabilities,	  
rights	  and	  responsibilities	  under	  plausible	  contingencies.	  If	  the	  Bangladesh	  government	  
moves	  too	  much	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  vulnerable	  authoritarian	  regime,	  this	  too	  may	  damage	  
the	  credibility	  of	  private	  sector	  contracting	  in	  areas	  like	  power	  where	  the	  country	  has	  to	  do	  
even	  better	  in	  the	  future.	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4. History	  and	  evidence	  of	  anti-­‐
corruption	  measures	  in	  Bangladesh	  	  
Like	  many	  developing	  countries,	  Bangladesh	  has	  extensive	  formal	  legislation	  supporting	  anti-­‐
corruption,	  but	  is	  deficient	  in	  the	  interpretation,	  application	  and	  implementation	  of	  these	  
laws.	  These	  laws,	  and	  the	  associated	  enforcement	  agencies,	  are	  geared	  to	  attacking	  
corruption	  in	  general,	  which	  we	  have	  described	  as	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  based	  on	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  from	  above	  (Khan	  et	  al.	  2017:	  12).	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  a	  
general	  or	  systemic	  attack	  on	  corruption	  based	  on	  ‘vertical	  enforcement’	  is	  implausible	  in	  a	  
context	  where	  many	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  organisations	  in	  the	  country	  are	  engaged	  in	  rule-­‐
violating	  behaviour	  or	  in	  informal	  contracting	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  In	  these	  contexts,	  the	  
‘horizontal’	  support	  by	  powerful	  organisations	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  general	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  
weak.	  If	  anti-­‐corruption	  laws	  are	  enforced	  from	  above	  in	  such	  a	  context,	  they	  are	  at	  best	  
likely	  to	  be	  applied	  selectively	  to	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  currently	  out	  of	  favour	  with	  
the	  ruling	  coalition.	  This	  type	  of	  enforcement	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  do	  much	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  
a	  general	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  this	  is	  indeed	  what	  we	  see	  across	  developing	  countries,	  with	  
Bangladesh	  no	  exception.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  ACE	  approach	  looks	  for	  opportunities	  in	  particular	  
sectors,	  where	  policies	  can	  be	  feasibly	  changed	  to	  create	  incentives	  for	  some	  of	  the	  
powerful	  players	  within	  these	  sectors	  to	  behave	  productively	  and	  thereby	  reduce	  
unproductive	  rent	  capture.	  If	  we	  can	  identify	  such	  opportunities,	  there	  may	  be	  sufficient	  
horizontal	  support	  at	  the	  sectoral	  level	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  rules	  for	  effective	  anti-­‐
corruption	  that	  achieves	  better	  developmental	  outcomes.	  In	  this	  section	  we	  list	  some	  of	  the	  
limitations	  of	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  initiatives	  in	  Bangladesh,	  and	  the	  implications	  for	  our	  
alternative	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies.	  	  
Bangladesh	  acceded	  to	  UNCAC	  (the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  against	  Corruption)	  in	  2007	  
during	  the	  tenure	  of	  the	  Emergency	  Caretaker	  Government	  that	  was	  committed	  to	  anti-­‐
corruption.	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  Government	  of	  Bangladesh	  commissioned	  a	  study	  to	  identify	  
possible	  gaps	  in	  existing	  laws	  and	  capacities	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  to	  bring	  
Bangladesh	  in	  line	  with	  requirements	  of	  the	  Convention	  (GOB	  2008).	  This	  study	  concluded	  
that	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  legal	  regime,	  Bangladesh	  was	  already	  largely	  compatible	  with	  the	  
standards	  and	  principles	  of	  UNCAC	  (GOB	  2008:	  9).	  Of	  course,	  this	  refers	  to	  the	  formal	  
aspects	  of	  the	  law	  and	  not	  its	  actual	  application	  in	  practice.	  The	  latter	  depends	  on	  
enforcement	  capabilities,	  and	  how	  powerful	  interests	  use	  informal	  procedures	  to	  modify	  or	  
subvert	  the	  application	  of	  formal	  laws.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  formal	  structure	  of	  laws	  is	  largely	  
aligned	  with	  UNCAC,	  and	  that	  considerable	  investments	  in	  capacity	  building	  for	  better	  
enforcement	  have	  not	  had	  significant	  effects,	  suggests	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  vertical	  enforcement	  
is	  insufficient	  for	  making	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  corruption.	  	  
The	  comprehensive	  legal	  regime	  in	  place	  in	  Bangladesh	  includes	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  law	  (the	  
Prevention	  of	  Corruption	  Act,	  1947)	  and	  the	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Commission	  Act,	  2004,	  that	  
created	  an	  independent	  anti-­‐corruption	  body.	  Furthermore,	  a	  comprehensive	  procurement	  
regime	  exists	  with	  the	  Public	  Procurement	  Regulations,	  2003	  and	  the	  Public	  Procurement	  
Act,	  2006.	  The	  regulatory	  regime	  that	  serves	  to	  promote	  public	  sector	  integrity,	  and	  governs	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issues	  of	  public	  sector	  recruitment,	  hiring,	  retention,	  promotion	  and	  retirement,	  consists	  of	  
the	  Bangladesh	  Civil	  Service	  Rules,	  1981,	  the	  Bangladesh	  Civil	  Service	  Recruitment	  (Age	  
Qualification	  and	  Examination	  for	  Direct	  Recruitment)	  Rules,	  1982,	  the	  Public	  Service	  
Commission	  Ordinance,	  1977,	  and	  guidelines	  for	  public	  sector	  training	  such	  as	  the	  Public	  
Administration	  Training	  Policy	  (PATP),	  2003.	  Furthermore,	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  
constitutionally	  sanctioned	  Office	  of	  the	  Comptroller	  and	  Auditor	  General	  (CAG)	  and	  the	  
Central	  Procurement	  Technical	  Unit	  (CPTU)	  are	  additional	  mechanisms	  to	  ensure	  greater	  
transparency	  and	  accountability	  in	  public	  procurement	  and	  public	  finance.	  
The	  study	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Emergency	  Government,	  referred	  to	  above,	  recognised	  that	  
implementation	  was	  weak,	  but	  did	  not	  give	  an	  indication	  of	  how	  seriously	  weak	  and	  in	  which	  
sectors	  and	  activities.	  For	  instance,	  it	  says	  that	  in	  procurement,	  the	  rules	  are	  applied	  
‘inconsistently’	  across	  government,	  and	  implementation	  is	  hampered	  by	  ‘inadequate	  
resources’	  in	  concerned	  agencies	  (GOB	  2008:	  10).	  This	  is	  a	  serious	  understatement	  of	  the	  
scale	  of	  the	  problem.	  In	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  Enterprise	  Survey	  of	  2013,	  49	  percent	  of	  firms	  in	  
Bangladesh	  expected	  to	  ‘give	  gifts’	  to	  secure	  a	  government	  contract,	  compared	  to	  46	  
percent	  in	  South	  Asia	  and	  29	  percent	  globally2.	  Public	  procurements	  are	  a	  serious	  problem	  
across	  developing	  countries,	  because	  they	  are	  closely	  linked	  to	  governments’	  patronage	  and	  
rent-­‐sharing	  strategies,	  making	  procurements	  a	  particularly	  difficult	  area	  in	  which	  to	  develop	  
a	  feasible	  sectoral	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy.	  In	  Bangladesh,	  the	  close	  links	  between	  the	  
government,	  politically	  connected	  contractors	  and	  more	  recently	  the	  army,	  in	  infrastructure	  
construction	  and	  contracting	  are	  well	  known.	  In	  our	  analysis,	  this	  makes	  it	  hard	  to	  find	  
feasible	  and	  effective	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  in	  this	  sector	  using	  our	  methodology.	  It	  is	  
not	  surprising	  that	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  enforcement	  strategies	  have	  delivered	  few	  
results	  in	  public	  procurements	  in	  Bangladesh.	  While	  procurements	  and	  contracts	  in	  
construction	  projects	  involve	  powerful	  coalitions	  and	  allocations	  of	  some	  of	  these	  rents	  on	  
political	  grounds	  to	  maintain	  the	  regime,	  procurements	  in	  other	  areas	  may	  offer	  greater	  
opportunities	  for	  incremental	  improvement.	  There	  may	  be	  opportunities	  for	  incremental	  
improvements	  in	  the	  procurements	  of	  medicines,	  for	  instance,	  where	  a	  variety	  of	  productive	  
interests	  are	  involved,	  rents	  are	  not	  generally	  allocated	  by	  the	  government	  to	  powerful	  
players	  to	  sustain	  the	  regime,	  and	  the	  quality	  and	  price	  of	  drugs	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  
delivery	  of	  health	  services	  that	  directly	  affect	  voter	  perceptions.	  	  
Another	  area	  where	  laws	  already	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  compliance	  with	  UNCAC	  requirements	  is	  in	  
the	  recruitment	  and	  promotion	  of	  public	  officials	  (GOB	  2008:	  10).	  Once	  again,	  the	  report	  
argues	  that	  implementation	  is	  weak	  and	  capacity	  improvements	  are	  necessary.	  However,	  
this	  is	  another	  area	  of	  systemic	  politicisation	  and	  corruption,	  involving	  political	  patronage	  
and	  strategies	  of	  regime	  reproduction.	  The	  ‘political’	  nature	  of	  the	  corruption	  in	  recruitment	  
and	  promotion	  means	  that	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  are	  again	  likely	  to	  face	  implementation	  
problems	  that	  go	  beyond	  the	  technical	  capacity	  of	  enforcement	  agencies.	  The	  recruitment	  
and	  promotion	  of	  bureaucrats	  has	  become	  progressively	  more	  politicised	  and	  closely	  linked	  
to	  political	  strategies	  of	  regime	  maintenance	  of	  whichever	  party	  is	  in	  power.	  Here	  too,	  not	  
only	  have	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  failed	  to	  make	  any	  significant	  impact,	  in	  our	  
	  
2	  World	  Enterprise	  Survey	  http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2013/bangladesh	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assessment	  incremental	  and	  sector-­‐specific	  strategies	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  make	  little	  headway.	  
It	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  find	  coalitions	  of	  bureaucrats	  and	  politicians,	  at	  any	  level,	  who	  have	  
both	  the	  power	  and	  the	  interest	  to	  want	  to	  implement	  formal	  rules	  for	  the	  selection	  and	  
promotion	  of	  civil	  servants	  as	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  legislation.	  	  
Both	  construction	  procurements	  and	  public	  service	  appointments	  and	  promotions	  are	  
examples	  of	  areas	  of	  corruption	  where	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  the	  
direction	  of	  a	  single-­‐party	  regime	  have	  made	  addressing	  these	  issues	  even	  less	  feasible.	  
Given	  the	  threats	  it	  faces	  from	  a	  potentially	  powerful	  but	  administratively	  excluded	  
opposition,	  the	  ruling	  party	  is	  even	  more	  concerned	  to	  ensure	  that	  civil	  service	  
appointments	  are	  limited	  to	  people	  it	  can	  politically	  trust.	  Similarly,	  the	  allocation	  of	  large	  
government	  construction	  contracts	  is	  an	  important	  way	  of	  creating	  coalitions	  of	  the	  
powerful	  to	  support	  the	  ruling	  party	  in	  administrative	  and	  other	  ways.	  The	  political	  
settlements	  analysis	  therefore	  tells	  us	  that	  these	  types	  of	  corruption	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  much	  
less	  feasible	  to	  address	  right	  now.	  	  
The	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Commission	  (ACC)	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  achieve	  systemic	  anti-­‐
corruption	  improvements	  for	  these	  reasons,	  because	  some	  important	  types	  of	  corruption	  
are	  quite	  intractable	  given	  the	  political	  settlement.	  The	  ACC	  has	  carried	  out	  a	  lot	  of	  activities,	  
but	  individuals	  and	  organisations	  that	  are	  currently	  powerful	  do	  not	  end	  up	  being	  
prosecuted,	  though	  very	  occasionally	  some	  may	  be	  investigated.	  In	  2015	  the	  ACC	  had	  3509	  
ongoing	  investigations,	  out	  of	  which	  it	  submitted	  charge	  sheets	  for	  389	  cases	  (ACC	  2015:	  26).	  
The	  cases	  then	  go	  to	  court	  and	  the	  outcome	  depends	  on	  further	  uncertainties	  as	  courts	  are	  
also	  subject	  to	  political	  pressure	  and	  corruption.	  Sometimes	  large	  scams	  that	  very	  probably	  
involved	  some	  politically	  powerful	  individuals	  are	  indeed	  investigated	  by	  the	  ACC,	  and	  some	  
offenders	  do	  end	  up	  in	  court.	  An	  example	  was	  a	  scam	  at	  the	  publicly	  owned	  Basic	  Bank,	  
where	  the	  equivalent	  of	  US$	  450	  million	  was	  stolen	  as	  a	  result	  of	  collusion	  between	  
borrowers	  and	  bank	  officials.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  investigation	  resulted	  in	  arrests	  and	  
prosecutions,	  though	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  what	  the	  courts	  decide	  in	  terms	  of	  convictions	  or	  
punishments	  (ACC	  2015:	  30-­‐31).	  Actual	  recovery	  of	  any	  stolen	  money	  is	  extremely	  unlikely	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  past	  experience.	  	  	  
When	  corruption	  allegations	  have	  included	  individuals	  connected	  with	  the	  government	  
there	  have	  always	  been	  forceful	  denials.	  Direct	  allegations	  or	  requests	  for	  action	  by	  the	  
international	  community	  have	  had	  limited	  effects,	  or	  have	  been	  entirely	  counterproductive.	  
An	  example	  of	  this	  was	  the	  Padma	  Bridge	  affair.	  A	  World	  Bank-­‐led	  consortium	  had	  agreed	  to	  
fund	  a	  $3	  billion	  bridge	  that	  would	  improve	  connectivity	  with	  southern	  Bangladesh	  and	  
deliver	  significant	  development	  benefits.	  Shortly	  before	  the	  project	  was	  to	  begin,	  an	  
unconnected	  investigation	  in	  Canada	  revealed	  documents	  that	  suggested	  that	  a	  Canadian	  
company,	  SNC-­‐Lavalin,	  had	  been	  planning	  to	  bribe	  ministers	  in	  Bangladesh	  to	  get	  a	  $50	  
million	  dollar	  engineering	  contract.	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  documents	  referred	  to	  a	  Bangladeshi	  
minister,	  an	  ex-­‐minister	  and	  other	  senior	  bureaucrats	  and	  political	  figures.	  The	  World	  Bank	  
insisted	  that	  the	  minister	  should	  be	  included	  in	  a	  full	  investigation,	  and	  though	  the	  
government	  eventually	  agreed	  to	  an	  investigation	  by	  the	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Commission	  (ACC),	  
the	  government	  insisted	  that	  the	  minister	  would	  not	  be	  included.	  The	  ACC	  did	  investigate	  a	  
number	  of	  lower-­‐level	  individuals	  but	  they	  were	  all	  eventually	  acquitted.	  The	  World	  Bank	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eventually	  withdrew	  from	  the	  project	  in	  January	  2013,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  satisfactory	  
investigation.	  Far	  from	  encouraging	  the	  government	  to	  take	  anti-­‐corruption	  more	  seriously,	  
the	  government	  eventually	  found	  more	  expensive	  financing	  from	  Chinese	  and	  other	  sources	  
to	  construct	  the	  bridge.	  The	  cost	  of	  construction	  was	  also	  inflated	  several	  times	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  any	  credible	  external	  monitoring	  of	  contracting	  and	  costs.	  Even	  if	  the	  bridge	  is	  
eventually	  built,	  Bangladeshi	  citizens	  will	  have	  paid	  a	  heavy	  price	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  overall	  
project	  cost	  and	  the	  interest	  charges.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  allegations,	  this	  exercise	  
in	  anti-­‐corruption	  did	  nothing	  to	  reduce	  corruption,	  and	  may	  even	  have	  strengthened	  the	  
government	  in	  future	  allegations,	  because	  it	  has	  shown	  that	  criticism	  could	  be	  resisted	  and	  
that	  the	  Bank	  and	  other	  development	  partners	  would	  return	  to	  participate	  in	  other	  projects.	  	  
While	  the	  ACC	  has	  not	  made	  any	  significant	  dent	  on	  systemic	  corruption,	  it	  is	  engaged	  in	  a	  
number	  of	  activities	  that	  are	  potentially	  useful	  from	  the	  alternative	  perspective	  of	  
incremental	  and	  sector-­‐focused	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies.	  The	  ACC	  organises	  public	  
hearings	  at	  district	  and	  sub-­‐district	  level	  in	  remote	  parts	  of	  Bangladesh,	  where	  members	  of	  
the	  public	  are	  invited	  to	  question	  officials	  of	  a	  number	  of	  ministries	  (so	  far	  Land,	  Health	  and	  
Power)	  on	  issues	  of	  corruption,	  delays	  in	  delivery,	  poor	  quality	  of	  services	  and	  so	  on.	  These	  
events	  are	  useful	  not	  only	  for	  raising	  awareness	  and	  putting	  some	  pressure	  on	  public	  
officials,	  but	  potentially	  also	  for	  generating	  evidence	  about	  the	  types	  of	  corruption	  that	  are	  
of	  concern	  to	  people	  and	  the	  feasibility	  of	  addressing	  them.	  One	  of	  the	  commissioners	  of	  the	  
ACC	  is	  interested	  in	  working	  with	  the	  ACE	  programme,	  and	  has	  invited	  us	  to	  use	  the	  public	  
hearings	  as	  a	  forum	  to	  collect	  evidence	  for	  our	  research.	  We	  are	  exploring	  a	  partnership	  with	  
the	  ACC	  in	  one	  of	  our	  health	  sector	  programmes,	  to	  use	  their	  public	  hearings	  for	  this	  
purpose.	  	  
The	  weakness	  of	  governance	  and	  the	  prevalence	  of	  corruption	  has	  also	  affected	  
development	  on	  a	  number	  of	  other	  fronts	  in	  recent	  years.	  A	  spate	  of	  industrial	  accidents,	  
including	  the	  tragic	  Rana	  Plaza	  collapse	  in	  2013	  where	  more	  than	  a	  thousand	  people	  died,	  
highlighted	  the	  direct	  effects	  of	  regulatory	  corruption	  on	  lives	  and	  indirectly	  on	  export	  
markets	  and	  jobs.	  This	  accident,	  like	  others	  in	  the	  industrial	  sector,	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  
failures	  of	  regulation	  and	  widespread	  corruption	  in	  the	  granting	  of	  building	  licenses	  and	  
other	  certification.	  Subsequently,	  some	  progress	  in	  credible	  certification	  has	  been	  achieved	  
through	  the	  Accord	  and	  Alliance	  processes.	  The	  regulation	  of	  building	  and	  labour	  codes	  is	  
one	  area	  where	  an	  incremental	  sector-­‐based	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy	  for	  improved	  
regulatory	  compliance	  has	  potential.	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  sectoral	  problem	  where	  the	  
interests	  of	  powerful	  players	  in	  the	  garments	  and	  textiles	  industry,	  and	  potentially	  of	  other	  
export-­‐oriented	  industries,	  are	  aligned	  with	  the	  achievement	  of	  better	  health	  and	  safety	  
outcomes,	  because	  their	  export	  incomes	  depend	  on	  it.	  Closer	  attention	  to	  the	  design	  of	  
regulatory	  institutions	  and	  certification	  processes	  should	  result	  in	  feasible	  reductions	  in	  
corruption,	  with	  very	  positive	  developmental	  impacts,	  and	  this	  is	  therefore	  an	  example	  of	  an	  
area	  where	  the	  ACE	  programme	  will	  focus.	  	  
There	  have	  been	  a	  number	  of	  major	  financial-­‐sector	  scandals	  in	  recent	  years,	  with	  the	  loss	  of	  
large	  sums	  of	  money	  that	  will	  have	  to	  be	  ultimately	  borne	  by	  the	  taxpayer.	  We	  have	  already	  
referred	  to	  the	  Basic	  Bank	  scandal.	  In	  the	  Hallmark	  scam	  in	  2012,	  involving	  the	  state-­‐owned	  
Sonali	  Bank,	  collusion	  between	  borrowers	  and	  bank	  managers	  led	  to	  the	  disappearance	  of	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almost	  half	  a	  billion	  dollars	  that	  were	  never	  recovered.	  A	  very	  small	  branch	  of	  the	  state-­‐
owned	  Sonali	  Bank,	  located	  in	  a	  central	  Dhaka	  hotel,	  provided	  illegal	  loans	  to	  a	  group	  of	  
companies	  including	  Hallmark	  that	  amounted	  to	  US$	  460	  million	  between	  2010	  and	  2012.	  
The	  loans	  were	  letters	  of	  credit	  provided	  to	  fake	  suppliers	  to	  these	  companies,	  which	  were	  
encashed	  against	  fake	  documents	  showing	  the	  supplies	  had	  been	  provided.	  The	  loans	  hugely	  
exceeded	  what	  the	  bank	  could	  lend	  to	  single	  clients,	  collateral	  documents	  were	  missing,	  and	  
the	  loans	  also	  exceeded	  what	  the	  tiny	  hotel	  branch	  was	  authorised	  to	  lend.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  
the	  branch	  manager	  could	  not	  have	  done	  this	  on	  his	  own	  without	  the	  sanction	  of	  higher	  
political	  authorities	  (Sabet	  and	  Ishtiaque	  2013).	  Although	  this	  fraud	  was	  six	  times	  bigger	  than	  
the	  next	  biggest	  fraud	  that	  had	  happened	  till	  then	  (involving	  the	  Oriental	  Bank	  in	  2007),	  the	  
Finance	  Minister	  initially	  dismissed	  the	  case	  as	  one	  involving	  an	  insignificant	  amount	  of	  
money.	  Pressure	  from	  various	  quarters	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  arrest	  of	  a	  few	  people,	  but	  
almost	  no	  money	  was	  recovered	  and	  the	  deeper	  political	  links	  were	  not	  uncovered.	  The	  
growing	  scale	  of	  bank	  frauds	  in	  recent	  years	  suggests	  that	  fraudsters,	  colluding	  with	  
bureaucratic	  or	  political	  insiders,	  clearly	  feel	  that	  they	  can	  now	  get	  away	  with	  fraud	  on	  a	  
very	  large	  scale.	  This	  could	  be	  because	  the	  chances	  of	  another	  political	  party	  coming	  to	  
power	  and	  trying	  to	  trace	  the	  money	  are	  now	  much	  lower,	  and	  this	  had	  been	  an	  important	  
factor	  constraining	  large-­‐scale	  corruption	  in	  the	  past.	  	  
Bangladesh	  is	  at	  a	  critical	  point	  in	  its	  governance	  and	  developmental	  evolution.	  It	  faces	  
significant	  challenges	  in	  diversifying	  its	  economy	  and	  maintaining	  its	  growth	  rate	  in	  a	  context	  
of	  a	  global	  slowdown	  and	  its	  own	  growing	  population.	  A	  broad-­‐based	  productive	  economy,	  
that	  could	  have	  supported	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  and	  improvements	  in	  other	  governance	  
indicators,	  with	  an	  effective	  demand	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  a	  rule	  of	  law	  that	  it	  could	  pay	  
for	  through	  taxes,	  has	  not	  yet	  developed.	  Powerful	  organisations	  are	  therefore	  still	  largely	  
outside	  the	  productive	  sector,	  and	  they	  do	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  interest	  in	  the	  enforcement	  
of	  a	  rule	  of	  law.	  Anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  that	  are	  based	  on	  vertical	  enforcement	  are	  therefore	  
weak,	  despite	  a	  robust	  civil	  society	  and	  a	  relatively	  active	  media.	  Moreover,	  international	  
pressure	  against	  systemic	  corruption	  is	  strongly	  resisted	  by	  ruling	  parties,	  as	  political	  
corruption	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  process	  through	  which	  they	  stay	  in	  power.	  This	  is	  
common	  to	  all	  developing	  countries	  with	  systemic	  political	  corruption,	  but	  the	  resistance	  to	  
investigation	  is	  greater	  in	  the	  context	  of	  political	  governments	  that	  have	  a	  legitimacy	  deficit	  
and	  feel	  vulnerable.	  In	  this	  context,	  supporting	  the	  diversification	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  
sustaining	  inclusive	  growth	  requires	  a	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  to	  anti-­‐corruption.	  We	  
should	  seek	  sectoral	  opportunities	  for	  feasible	  governance	  improvements	  that	  can	  reduce	  
corruption	  in	  the	  form	  of	  unproductive	  rent	  and	  resource	  capture,	  without	  immediately	  
taking	  on	  the	  most	  sensitive	  types	  of	  political	  corruption.	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5. Strategic	  opportunities	  for	  anti-­‐
corruption	  in	  Bangladesh	  	  
The	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  in	  Section	  3	  suggests	  that	  not	  only	  is	  systemic	  anti-­‐
corruption	  unlikely	  to	  deliver	  significant	  results	  in	  Bangladesh,	  the	  strident	  reaction	  of	  a	  
vulnerable	  government	  to	  charges	  of	  corruption	  can	  result	  in	  significant	  setbacks	  for	  
development	  partners	  who	  try	  to	  address	  corruption	  through	  vertical	  enforcement,	  
investigation	  and	  prosecution.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  development	  partners	  like	  the	  World	  
Bank	  should	  ignore	  the	  possibility	  of	  corruption	  in	  major	  projects.	  For	  instance,	  it	  may	  have	  
been	  necessary	  to	  quietly	  withdraw	  from	  the	  Padma	  Bridge	  project,	  if	  there	  was	  a	  doubt	  
about	  a	  conspiracy	  that	  could	  not	  be	  adequately	  investigated.	  But	  we	  should	  not	  have	  a	  high	  
expectation	  that	  demands	  for	  a	  thorough	  and	  impartial	  investigation	  in	  these	  areas	  will	  
actually	  be	  carried	  out.	  Our	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  implementable	  anti-­‐
corruption	  activities	  should	  have	  a	  low	  profile,	  and	  be	  based	  on	  an	  outcome-­‐oriented	  and	  
incremental	  set	  of	  policy	  proposals.	  The	  emphasis	  should	  not	  exclusively	  be	  on	  prosecution	  
and	  punishment,	  but	  rather	  on	  finding	  policy	  combinations	  that	  create	  incentives	  for	  
stakeholders	  in	  particular	  sectors	  or	  activities	  to	  behave	  in	  more	  productive	  ways.	  If	  
horizontal	  support	  for	  anti-­‐corruption	  cannot	  be	  found	  at	  a	  systemic	  level	  for	  a	  general	  rule	  
of	  law,	  we	  should	  look	  for	  horizontal	  support	  for	  very	  specific	  anti-­‐corruption	  efforts	  that	  
align	  development	  outcomes	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  powerful	  sectoral	  stakeholders.	  	  
Our	  alternative	  approach	  to	  anti-­‐corruption	  looks	  for	  feasible	  and	  high-­‐impact	  anti-­‐
corruption	  opportunities	  in	  areas	  where	  changes	  in	  policies	  and	  interventions	  may	  be	  
potentially	  supported	  by	  some	  powerful	  players,	  who	  see	  the	  enforcement	  of	  specific	  
policies	  as	  being	  in	  their	  own	  interest.	  Clearly	  these	  opportunities	  have	  to	  be	  carefully	  
sought	  out.	  We	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  different	  types	  of	  corruption	  and	  we	  focus	  on	  
the	  types	  that	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  relevant	  for	  our	  approach.	  	  
Some	  corruption	  is	  driven	  by	  red	  tape	  and	  bureaucratic	  delays.	  We	  call	  these	  types	  of	  
corruption	  market	  restriction-­‐driven	  corruption.	  The	  causes	  of	  this	  type	  of	  corruption	  are	  
often	  quite	  feasible	  to	  address	  through	  the	  simplification	  of	  procedures.	  For	  instance,	  the	  
World	  Bank	  is	  already	  doing	  good	  work	  in	  Bangladesh	  and	  elsewhere	  on	  this	  front,	  through	  
its	  Doing	  Business	  surveys	  and	  reforms	  linked	  to	  that.	  However,	  reducing	  this	  type	  of	  
corruption	  often	  does	  not	  have	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  development	  outcomes.	  A	  more	  serious	  
type	  of	  corruption	  is	  when	  corruption	  distorts	  the	  implementation	  of	  important	  state	  
policies,	  for	  instance	  through	  the	  capture	  of	  resources	  in	  health,	  education,	  the	  financing	  of	  
skills	  and	  technology	  acquisition	  and	  so	  on.	  We	  call	  this	  policy-­‐distorting	  corruption,	  and	  we	  
argue	  that	  if	  some	  of	  this	  can	  be	  feasibly	  addressed,	  the	  impact	  on	  development	  can	  be	  
significant.	  Not	  only	  do	  these	  types	  of	  corruption	  have	  a	  high	  impact	  on	  outcomes,	  the	  
presence	  of	  potentially	  productive	  players	  in	  these	  activities	  create	  opportunities	  for	  the	  
type	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  that	  ACE	  investigates.	  Another	  important	  type	  of	  
corruption	  in	  developing	  countries	  involves	  patronage	  and	  rent	  distribution	  by	  political	  
parties	  and	  we	  call	  this	  political	  corruption.	  Political	  corruption	  can	  often	  interface	  with	  
policy-­‐distorting	  corruption	  if	  politicians	  capture	  policy	  resources	  and	  allocate	  these	  to	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clients.	  This	  can	  make	  policy-­‐distorting	  corruption	  difficult	  to	  address,	  but	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  
equally	  severe	  in	  every	  sector	  or	  activity.	  This	  is	  why	  addressing	  corruption	  in	  areas	  like	  the	  
Padma	  bridge	  procurements	  is	  so	  difficult:	  policy-­‐distorting	  corruption	  may	  be	  too	  sensitive	  
to	  address	  when	  senior	  ministers	  are	  involved.	  Political	  corruption	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  to	  
address,	  and	  attempting	  to	  tackle	  this	  brings	  anti-­‐corruption	  into	  conflict	  with	  political	  
leaderships.	  This	  is	  one	  reason	  why	  systemic	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  typically	  fail.	  Finally,	  
there	  is	  predatory	  corruption,	  and	  this	  happens	  when	  individual	  politicians	  or	  bureaucrats	  
steal	  public	  resources	  for	  themselves,	  or	  extort	  from	  others.	  This	  too	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  
address	  because	  when	  it	  happens	  on	  any	  significant	  scale,	  it	  is	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  state	  
has	  lost	  control	  over	  itself	  (Khan	  et	  al.	  2017).	  If	  predatory	  corruption	  has	  become	  significant,	  
it	  can	  only	  be	  addressed	  with	  very	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  political	  
settlement	  and	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  state.	  In	  our	  assessment,	  while	  there	  is	  a	  danger	  that	  
Bangladesh	  may	  be	  moving	  in	  that	  direction,	  predatory	  corruption	  is	  still	  not	  the	  primary	  
type	  of	  corruption	  that	  the	  country	  faces.	  
Combining	  our	  analysis	  in	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  drivers	  of	  growth	  in	  Bangladesh	  (and	  therefore	  
the	  policy	  priorities	  for	  sustaining	  inclusive	  growth)	  with	  our	  analysis	  in	  Section	  3	  of	  the	  
political	  settlement	  and	  its	  evolution,	  we	  outline	  the	  types	  of	  sectoral	  anti-­‐corruption	  
opportunities	  that	  are	  important	  to	  explore	  as	  part	  of	  our	  portfolio	  of	  incremental	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategies.	  Inclusive	  growth	  in	  Bangladesh	  requires	  policies	  supporting	  
manufacturing	  employment	  growth,	  as	  well	  as	  supportive	  productive	  strategies	  in	  
agriculture	  and	  services.	  This	  suggests	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  that	  may	  be	  
both	  feasible	  and	  have	  high	  impact,	  our	  two	  conditions	  for	  identifying	  effective	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategies	  (Khan	  et	  al.	  2017).	  In	  productive	  sectors,	  we	  look	  for	  policy-­‐distorting	  
corruption	  where	  the	  corruption	  is	  not	  closely	  connected	  with	  high-­‐level	  political	  interests	  
and	  regime	  strategies	  for	  staying	  in	  power.	  In	  these	  areas,	  there	  may	  be	  productive	  interests	  
who	  may	  be	  induced	  to	  support	  more	  productive	  strategies	  in	  their	  own	  interest,	  with	  
judicious	  changes	  in	  policies,	  incentives	  or	  the	  organisation	  of	  appropriate	  collective	  action.	  	  
In	  our	  scoping	  studies	  we	  looked	  for	  such	  opportunities,	  keeping	  our	  analyses	  of	  economic	  
challenges	  and	  political	  settlements	  in	  mind.	  In	  consultation	  with	  DFID,	  other	  development	  
partners,	  our	  country	  research	  partners,	  and	  using	  our	  own	  knowledge	  of	  the	  country	  and	  of	  
past	  research,	  we	  have	  identified	  a	  series	  of	  evidence-­‐based	  research	  projects	  that	  will	  aim	  
to	  identify	  feasible	  and	  high-­‐impact	  anti-­‐corruption	  opportunities.	  We	  have	  taken	  care	  to	  
include	  projects	  in	  a	  number	  of	  significant	  sectors	  of	  development	  activity:	  public	  goods	  and	  
infrastructure,	  productive	  sectors	  and	  skills,	  health	  and	  health	  delivery	  and	  governance	  
agencies	  and	  media.	  The	  opportunities	  in	  each	  of	  these	  categories	  were	  not	  identical	  in	  our	  
three	  study	  countries	  (Bangladesh,	  Nigeria	  and	  Tanzania).	  Here	  we	  report	  the	  types	  of	  
sectoral	  anti-­‐corruption	  opportunities	  that	  we	  want	  to	  study	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Bangladesh,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  cross-­‐country	  studies.	  Each	  of	  our	  projects	  is	  expected	  to	  generate	  evidence	  
about	  feasible	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  fall	  into	  one	  of	  four	  types	  of	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategies.	  These	  strategies	  and	  the	  projects	  which	  we	  believe	  will	  generate	  
evidence	  of	  feasible	  anti-­‐corruption	  under	  each,	  are	  summarized	  in	  Figure	  8	  and	  explained	  in	  
more	  detail	  in	  Khan	  et	  al.	  (2017).	  Figure	  8	  also	  lists	  more	  than	  ten	  sectoral	  projects	  that	  we	  
have	  planned	  for	  Bangladesh	  over	  the	  life	  of	  the	  ACE	  programme.	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Notes:	  	  
1.	  Aligning	  incentives	  
Here,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy	  is	  to	  change	  the	  relative	  returns	  to	  activities	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  a	  connected	  
production	  process	  or	  value	  chain,	  to	  create	  support	  for	  specific	  anti-­‐corruption	  initiatives.	  	  
2.	  Designing	  for	  differences	  	  
Here	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy	  is	  to	  address	  differences	  in	  the	  interests	  and	  capabilities	  of	  different	  types	  of	  
organisations	  to	  enable	  the	  potentially	  compliant	  to	  comply,	  and	  selecting	  appropriate	  strategies	  for	  dealing	  with	  others.	  	  
3.	  Building	  coalitions	  	  
The	  primary	  focus	  of	  these	  strategies	  is	  to	  organise	  groups	  to	  engage	  in	  effective	  collective	  action	  to	  support	  the	  
enforcement	  of	  particular	  aspects	  of	  an	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategy.	  	  
4.	  Resolving	  rights	  
Some	  corruption	  problems	  emerge	  because	  there	  are	  overlapping	  or	  contested	  rights	  and	  the	  only	  resolution	  available	  to	  
the	  contesting	  parties	  may	  be	  to	  engage	  in	  corruption	  as	  a	  way	  of	  resolving	  disputes.	  	  
See	  Khan	  et	  al.	  (2017)	  for	  more	  details	  on	  each	  of	  these	  strategies.	  
(B):	  projects	  that	  only	  cover	  Bangladesh,	  (BNT):	  cross-­‐country	  projects	  that	  cover	  Bangladesh,	  Nigeria	  and	  Tanzania.	  
Source:	  Author	  
Under	  public	  goods	  and	  infrastructure	  we	  have	  identified	  three	  areas	  for	  evidence-­‐based	  
investigation	  of	  anti-­‐corruption	  opportunities.	  The	  power	  generation	  sector	  is	  crucially	  
important	  for	  inclusive	  growth.	  This	  sector	  involves	  very	  large	  rents	  with	  significant	  policy-­‐
distorting	  corruption.	  As	  we	  described	  earlier,	  generation	  capacity	  has	  increased	  significantly	  
since	  2009,	  but	  many	  of	  the	  new	  generation	  companies	  are	  high	  cost	  peaking	  power	  plants	  
that	  were	  not	  designed	  to	  support	  base	  load.	  However,	  there	  are	  now	  vested	  interests	  that	  
seek	  to	  sustain	  and	  expand	  what	  was	  initially	  an	  emergency	  measure.	  The	  companies	  at	  play	  
are	  also	  typically	  politically	  connected.	  It	  may	  therefore	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  area	  where	  
effective	  and	  incremental	  anti-­‐corruption	  may	  by	  unlikely	  given	  the	  significant	  political	  
involvement.	  This	  assessment	  is	  not	  wrong,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  sector	  where	  there	  is	  considerable	  











National	  Board	  of	  
Revenue	  (NBR)	  and	  






Climate	  Change	  (B)	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Bangladesh:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
42	  
opportunity	  for	  making	  money	  in	  productive	  ways.	  Our	  scoping	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  with	  a	  
feasible	  change	  in	  financing	  instruments	  (hence	  re-­‐aligning	  incentives),	  some	  productive	  
players	  may	  begin	  to	  support	  better	  enforcement	  of	  procurement	  and	  other	  rules	  that	  
reduce	  unproductive	  rent	  capture.	  Anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  are	  not	  always	  guaranteed	  to	  
work,	  but	  if	  our	  research	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  a	  plausible	  outcome,	  it	  would	  provide	  evidence	  
for	  development	  partners	  and	  industry	  insiders	  to	  lobby	  for	  changes	  in	  the	  requisite	  policy	  
combinations.	  	  
Corruption	  in	  climate	  change	  investments	  has	  been	  very	  significant	  in	  Bangladesh	  and	  has	  
resulted	  in	  a	  virtual	  termination	  of	  support	  for	  this	  sector	  by	  development	  partners.	  Our	  
project	  looks	  at	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  smaller,	  localised	  projects,	  aligned	  with	  the	  
interests	  of	  local	  stakeholders	  as	  a	  corruption-­‐reducing	  strategy.	  In	  the	  public	  goods	  
category,	  we	  also	  look	  at	  the	  registration	  of	  land	  rights.	  Here	  our	  scoping	  study	  suggested	  
that	  digitisation	  and	  transparency	  may	  indeed	  help	  to	  reduce	  some	  types	  of	  corruption,	  but	  
do	  not	  address	  a	  very	  important	  source	  of	  corruption:	  the	  problem	  of	  conflicts	  between	  
competing	  land-­‐right	  documents	  where	  each	  may	  be	  partially	  legitimate.	  Here	  our	  anti-­‐
corruption	  research	  explores	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  driver	  of	  corruption,	  and	  the	  evidence	  
supporting	  the	  possibility	  of	  conflict-­‐resolution	  strategies	  as	  a	  way	  of	  mitigating	  this	  type	  of	  
corruption.	  	  
We	  have	  a	  number	  of	  important	  projects	  under	  productive	  sectors	  and	  skills.	  The	  study	  on	  
business	  groups	  is	  a	  historical	  political	  economy	  study	  that	  compares	  the	  rise	  of	  big	  business	  
houses	  across	  our	  three	  countries.	  Companies	  like	  Beximco	  or	  Summit	  in	  Bangladesh,	  or	  
Bakhresa	  in	  Tanzania,	  or	  Dangote	  in	  Nigeria	  have	  grown	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  political	  
connections	  and	  their	  own	  capability	  development	  and	  enterprise.	  They	  differ	  amongst	  
themselves	  in	  their	  capabilities	  and	  efficiency.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  many	  other	  politically	  
connected	  companies	  that	  are	  considerably	  less	  productive.	  The	  question	  for	  this	  research	  
will	  be	  to	  explore	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  business-­‐government	  relationships	  have	  had	  
positive	  or	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  development	  of	  enterprise	  and	  productivity	  in	  our	  three	  
countries.	  This	  evidence	  will	  be	  important	  for	  designing	  sectoral	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies	  
involving	  businesses	  as	  partners.	  	  
The	  skills	  programme	  is	  also	  comparative	  across	  our	  three	  countries	  and	  addresses	  a	  
critically	  important	  sector.	  Huge	  budgets	  are	  allocated	  to	  skills	  development	  in	  these	  
countries	  but	  much	  of	  it	  is	  wasted.	  Unskilled	  trainers	  are	  often	  appointed	  and	  collusion	  or	  
design	  failures	  result	  in	  large	  numbers	  of	  trainees	  not	  being	  employable.	  We	  will	  work	  with	  
our	  consortium	  partner	  Palladium,	  who	  run	  the	  (DFID-­‐supported)	  Sudokkho	  programme	  in	  
Bangladesh,	  and	  other	  successful	  skills	  providers	  like	  UCEP,	  to	  see	  how	  mismatches	  between	  
trainees	  and	  employers,	  and	  particularly	  poor	  capabilities	  of	  employers,	  can	  create	  
incentives	  for	  damaging	  types	  of	  corruption	  in	  training	  programmes.	  The	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  if	  
employers	  do	  not	  have	  the	  capabilities	  to	  achieve	  higher	  productivity	  and	  profits	  once	  they	  
get	  more	  skilled	  workers,	  they	  are	  unwilling	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  training	  either	  directly	  or	  in	  higher	  
wages.	  This	  creates	  incentives	  for	  training	  providers	  to	  provide	  poor	  training	  and	  to	  engage	  
in	  corruption	  to	  get	  outcome-­‐linked	  payments	  released.	  To	  enable	  skills	  providers	  to	  meet	  
their	  performance	  targets	  without	  corruption,	  policy	  may	  have	  to	  combine	  skills	  training	  for	  
workers	  with	  capability	  development	  investments	  for	  employers.	  Our	  project	  on	  secondary	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Bangladesh:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
43	  
education	  will	  begin	  at	  a	  later	  stage	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  ACE	  programme,	  and	  will	  look	  at	  some	  
of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  massive	  resource	  leakages	  that	  result	  in	  very	  poor	  outcomes	  in	  
secondary	  education	  in	  Bangladesh.	  	  
Our	  garments	  sector	  research	  will	  look	  at	  regulatory	  failures	  that	  lead	  to	  catastrophes	  like	  
the	  Rana	  Plaza	  collapse.	  Here	  too,	  the	  evidence	  of	  Accord	  and	  Alliance	  show	  that	  policy	  
changes	  can	  result	  in	  support	  for	  compliance	  from	  industry.	  Our	  research	  will	  look	  at	  the	  
evidence	  of	  how	  differences	  in	  the	  capabilities	  and	  capitalisation	  of	  firms	  can	  result	  in	  
different	  compliance	  strategies.	  Effective	  policy	  combinations	  for	  improving	  regulatory	  
compliance	  have	  to	  address	  the	  distinct	  problems	  of	  different	  types	  of	  firms.	  	  
The	  fishing	  cooperatives	  research	  will	  look	  at	  why	  cooperatives	  of	  poor	  fishermen	  suffer	  
from	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption,	  and	  achieve	  low	  increases	  in	  yields,	  compared	  to	  informal	  
cooperatives	  of	  small	  landholders	  like	  the	  Daudkandi	  model	  innovated	  by	  the	  NGO	  Shisuk.	  
We	  believe	  the	  evidence	  will	  show	  that	  the	  legal	  framework	  does	  not	  adequately	  recognise	  
the	  capabilities	  of	  different	  types	  of	  fishing	  collectives,	  and	  corruption	  can	  be	  significantly	  
reduced	  and	  yields	  enhanced	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  law	  on	  cooperatives.	  Given	  the	  low	  
productive	  and	  entrepreneurial	  capabilities	  of	  poor	  fishermen,	  the	  design	  of	  collective	  
organisations	  that	  does	  not	  create	  opportunities	  for	  capability	  development	  and	  enterprise,	  
actually	  creates	  incentives	  for	  unproductive	  rent	  capture.	  The	  relative	  success	  of	  the	  
Daudkandi	  (Shisuk)	  model	  is	  that	  its	  design	  allowed	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  entrepreneurial	  
capabilities	  and	  investments,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  standard	  cooperative	  model.	  However,	  
Bangladesh’s	  current	  law	  does	  not	  support	  the	  organisation	  of	  collective	  farming	  using	  this	  
type	  of	  enterprise	  model,	  as	  existing	  company	  law	  and	  cooperative	  law	  do	  not	  address	  the	  
problems	  of	  capabilities	  and	  investments	  adequately.	  	  
Our	  project	  on	  how	  smuggling	  affects	  the	  prospects	  of	  the	  domestic	  electronics	  industry	  is	  a	  
way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  National	  Board	  of	  Revenue	  (NBR),	  which	  is	  known	  to	  
often	  corruptly	  collude	  with	  taxpayers	  to	  collect	  lower	  taxes.	  In	  general,	  horizontal	  pressure	  
on	  the	  NBR	  from	  powerful	  organizations	  to	  collect	  taxes	  is	  low	  given	  that	  these	  organizations	  
do	  not	  yet	  benefit	  much	  from	  limited	  government	  expenditures	  on	  public	  goods.	  However,	  
there	  are	  some	  areas	  like	  electronics	  smuggling	  where	  powerful	  domestic	  interests	  are	  hurt	  
by	  the	  failure	  to	  collect	  duties.	  Evidence	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  this	  smuggling,	  and	  the	  sources	  of	  
leakages,	  can	  provide	  ammunition	  to	  the	  electronics	  industry	  to	  organise	  its	  collective	  action	  
to	  build	  coalitions	  and	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  NBR	  to	  properly	  collect	  customs	  duties	  on	  
electronics	  imports.	  This	  can	  help	  to	  improve	  the	  enforcement	  of	  duty	  collection	  for	  
electronics	  products	  as	  well	  as	  supporting	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  domestic	  electronics	  industry.	  
Incremental	  improvements	  in	  tax	  collection	  aligned	  with	  domestic	  productive	  interests	  may	  
provide	  a	  more	  sustainable	  strategy	  of	  improving	  the	  overall	  performance	  of	  governance	  
agencies	  like	  the	  NBR.	  
Under	  health	  we	  have	  a	  number	  of	  projects	  on	  different	  aspects	  of	  health	  provision,	  
pharmaceutical	  production	  and	  regulation	  and	  the	  procurement	  of	  medicines	  by	  health	  
providers.	  In	  all	  these	  projects	  we	  will	  be	  looking	  for	  possibilities	  of	  improving	  outcomes	  by	  
exploring	  and	  helping	  to	  justify	  the	  creation	  of	  incentives	  for	  some	  health	  sector	  providers	  or	  
stakeholders	  to	  behave	  differently,	  in	  more	  productive	  ways.	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Finally,	  we	  have	  a	  cross-­‐country	  project	  on	  the	  media	  where	  we	  look	  at	  evidence	  of	  how	  the	  
media	  reports	  corruption,	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  reporting	  and	  how	  the	  media	  could	  be	  
incentivised	  to	  think	  about	  and	  report	  on	  incremental	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies,	  in	  ways	  
that	  may	  help	  feasible	  policy	  implementation.	  	  
In	  all	  these	  projects,	  the	  ACE	  approach	  to	  evidence	  and	  analysis	  is	  to	  find	  possibilities	  of	  
creating	  coalitions	  of	  interests	  at	  the	  sectoral	  level	  that	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  changing	  their	  
behaviour	  in	  productive	  ways,	  with	  some	  interdependent	  policy	  and	  governance	  
interventions.	  An	  anti-­‐corruption	  coalition	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  contexts	  like	  
Bangladesh	  if	  it	  does	  not	  seriously	  challenge	  the	  political	  settlement	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  
core	  regime-­‐survival	  interests	  of	  the	  ruling	  coalition.	  In	  the	  research	  questions	  we	  have	  
chosen	  this	  condition	  is	  met,	  though	  in	  some	  cases	  unproductive	  interests	  in	  a	  sector	  may	  
turn	  out	  to	  be	  closely	  connected	  with	  powerful	  political	  players.	  In	  some	  of	  these	  cases,	  
feasible	  incremental	  changes	  may	  not	  be	  possible,	  and	  the	  task	  of	  the	  research	  is	  also	  to	  
evaluate	  these	  risks	  before	  time	  and	  resources	  are	  wasted	  on	  policy	  formulation.	  
Nevertheless,	  we	  believe	  that	  by	  selecting	  our	  research	  projects	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
political	  settlement	  and	  using	  a	  framework	  for	  identifying	  feasible	  anti-­‐corruption	  strategies,	  
we	  have	  maximised	  our	  chances	  of	  finding	  a	  number	  of	  feasible	  and	  high-­‐impact	  anti-­‐
corruption	  opportunities	  in	  our	  countries.	  We	  have	  also	  deliberately	  focused	  on	  sectors	  in	  
each	  country	  where	  the	  multiplier	  effects	  of	  better	  development	  outcomes	  are	  highest,	  in	  
terms	  of	  supporting	  proven	  trajectories	  of	  inclusive	  growth	  and	  contributing	  to	  broad-­‐based	  
development.	  This	  is	  the	  best	  strategy	  for	  supporting	  progressively	  more	  ambitious	  anti-­‐
corruption	  strategies	  that	  should	  eventually	  lead	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  implementing	  a	  
society-­‐wide	  vertical	  enforcement	  of	  a	  general	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Bangladesh:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
45	  
6. References	  
ACC	  2015.	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Commission	  of	  Bangladesh:	  Annual	  Report	  2015.	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  Commission	  
Bangladesh:	  Dhaka.	  
Ahmed,	  Muhammad	  Nehal	  and	  Muhammad	  Sakhawat	  Hossain	  2006.	  Future	  Prospects	  of	  Bangladesh's	  Ready-­‐
Made	  Garments	  Industry	  and	  the	  Supportive	  Policy	  Regime.	  Policy	  Note	  Series	  	  No.	  PN	  0702.	  Policy	  Analysis	  
Unit	  (PAU)	  Bangladesh	  Bank:	  Dhaka.	  
Hassan,	  Mirza	  2013.	  Political	  Settlement	  Dynamics	  in	  a	  Limited-­‐Access	  Order:	  The	  Case	  of	  Bangladesh.	  Effective	  
States	  and	  Inclusive	  Development	  Research	  Centre	  Working	  Paper	  	  No.	  23.	  University	  of	  Manchester:	  
Manchester.	  
Islam,	  Nurul	  1979.	  Development	  Planning	  in	  Bangladesh:	  A	  Study	  in	  Political	  Economy.	  Dhaka:	  University	  Press	  
Ltd.	  
Jolliffe,	  Dean,	  Iffath	  Sharif,	  Lea	  Gimenez	  and	  Faizuddin	  Ahmed	  2013.	  Bangladesh	  -­‐	  Poverty	  Assessment:	  
Assessing	  a	  Decade	  of	  Progress	  in	  Reducing	  Poverty,	  2000-­‐2010.	  Bangladesh	  Development	  Series	  Paper	  no.	  31.	  
World	  Bank:	  Washington	  DC.	  
Kar,	  Dev	  and	  Joseph	  Spanjers	  2015.	  Illicit	  Financial	  Flows	  from	  Developing	  Countries:	  2004-­‐2013.	  Global	  
Financial	  Integrity:	  Washington	  DC.	  
Khan,	  Mushtaq	  Husain	  2004.	  Power,	  Property	  Rights	  and	  the	  Issue	  of	  Land	  Reform:	  A	  General	  Case	  Illustrated	  
with	  Reference	  to	  Bangladesh,	  Journal	  of	  Agrarian	  Change	  January	  and	  April	  4	  (1-­‐2):	  73-­‐106.	  
Khan,	  Mushtaq	  Husain	  2010.	  Political	  Settlements	  and	  the	  Governance	  of	  Growth-­‐Enhancing	  Institutions.	  
Research	  Paper	  Series	  on	  Governance	  for	  Growth.	  School	  of	  Oriental	  and	  African	  Studies,	  University	  of	  London:	  
London.	  Available	  <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968>	  
Khan,	  Mushtaq	  Husain	  2012.	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Inclusive	  Growth,	  in	  de	  Mello,	  Luiz	  and	  Mark	  A.	  Dutz	  
(eds)	  Promoting	  Inclusive	  Growth:	  Challenges	  and	  Policies,	  pp.	  15-­‐54,	  Paris:	  OECD	  Publishing.	  Available	  
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264168305-­‐3-­‐en>	  
Khan,	  Mushtaq	  Husain	  2013a.	  Bangladesh:	  Economic	  Growth	  in	  a	  Vulnerable	  Limited	  Access	  Order,	  in	  North,	  
Douglass,	  John	  Wallis,	  Steven	  Webb	  and	  Barry	  Weingast	  (eds)	  In	  the	  Shadow	  of	  Violence:	  Politics,	  Economics,	  
and	  the	  Problems	  of	  Development,	  pp.	  24-­‐69,	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Available	  
<http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/11680/1/Bangladesh_LAO.pdf>	  
Khan,	  Mushtaq	  Husain	  2013b.	  The	  Political	  Settlement,	  Growth	  and	  Technical	  Progress	  in	  Bangladesh.	  DIIS	  
Working	  Paper	  	  No.	  2013:01.	  Danish	  Institute	  for	  International	  Studies:	  Copenhagen.	  Available	  
<http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2013/WP2013-­‐01.Bangladesh%20-­‐%20Mushtaq-­‐H-­‐Khan.pdf>	  
Khan,	  Mushtaq	  Husain	  2014.	  Aid	  and	  Governance	  in	  Vulnerable	  States:	  Bangladesh	  and	  Pakistan	  since	  1971,	  
The	  Annals	  of	  the	  American	  Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  Social	  Science	  656	  (1):	  59-­‐78.	  
Khan,	  Mushtaq	  Husain	  2015.	  Industrial	  Policy	  Design	  and	  Implementation	  Challenges,	  in	  Felipe,	  Jesus	  (ed.)	  
Development	  and	  Modern	  Industrial	  Policy	  in	  Practice:	  Issues	  and	  Country	  Experiences,	  Cheltenham:	  Edwar	  
Elgar.	  
Khan,	  Mushtaq	  Husain,	  Antonio	  Andreoni	  and	  Pallavi	  Roy	  2017.	  Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Adverse	  Contexts:	  A	  
Strategic	  Approach.	  SOAS:	  London.	  Available	  <http://www.ace.soas.ac.uk>	  
Lewis,	  William	  Arthur	  1954.	  Economic	  Development	  with	  Unlimited	  Supplies	  of	  Labour,	  The	  Manchester	  School	  
22	  (2):	  139-­‐91.	  
Mahmud,	  Wahiduddin,	  Sadiq	  Ahmed	  and	  Sandeep	  Mahajan	  2008.	  Economic	  Reforms,	  Growth,	  and	  
Governance:	  The	  Political	  Economy	  Aspects	  of	  Bangladesh's	  Development	  Surprise.	  Commission	  on	  Growth	  and	  
Development.	  The	  World	  Bank:	  Washington	  DC.	  Available	  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546-­‐1214948920836/gcwp022web.pdf>	  
Rhee,	  Yung	  Whee	  1990.	  The	  Catalyst	  Model	  of	  Development:	  Lessons	  from	  Bangladesh's	  Success	  with	  
Garments	  Exports,	  World	  Development	  18	  (2):	  333-­‐46.	  
Anti-­‐Corruption	  in	  Bangladesh:	  A	  political	  settlements	  analysis	  
46	  
Sabet,	  Daniel	  and	  Ahmed	  S.	  Ishtiaque	  2013.	  Understanding	  the	  Hallmark-­‐Sonali	  Bank	  Loan	  Scandal.	  Monthly	  
Current	  Events	  Analysis	  Series	  (Center	  for	  Enterprise	  and	  Society).	  University	  of	  Liberal	  Arts	  Bangladesh	  (ULAB):	  
Dhaka.	  
Shah,	  Wajid	  Hasan	  2014.	  Investments	  and	  FDI	  in	  Bangladesh:	  Potential	  vs.	  Reality.	  Economic	  Policy	  Forum	  (EPF)	  
Working	  Paper.	  Economic	  Policy	  Forum:	  Beijing.	  
Titumir,	  Rashed	  Al	  Mahmud.	  2013.	  Accumulation,	  Land	  Transactions	  and	  the	  Agrarian	  Transition	  in	  Bangladesh.	  
PhD	  Thesis,	  Economics,	  SOAS,	  University	  of	  London,	  London.	  
Transparency	  International	  Bangladesh	  2014.	  National	  Integrity	  System	  Assessment	  Bangladesh.	  Authors:	  
Salahuddin	  Aminuzzaman	  and	  Sumaiya	  Khair.	  Transparency	  International	  Bangladesh:	  Dhaka.	  
World	  Bank	  2000.	  Bangladesh:	  Study	  of	  Land	  Issues.	  World	  Bank	  Dhaka	  Office	  and	  SASRD:	  Dhaka.	  
World	  Bank	  2007.	  Bangladesh:	  Strategy	  for	  Sustained	  Growth.	  Bangladesh	  Development	  Series	  	  No.	  18.	  The	  
World	  Bank,	  Poverty	  Reduction	  and	  Economic	  Management	  Unit:	  Dhaka.	  
World	  Bank	  2012.	  Doing	  Business	  2012:	  Doing	  Business	  in	  a	  More	  Transparent	  World.	  World	  Bank:	  Washington	  
DC.	  
World	  Bank	  2015a.	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  Online.	  Accessed	  through	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Data	  Service.	  
ESDS:	  Manchester.	  
World	  Bank	  2015b.	  Bangladesh	  Development	  Update.	  World	  Bank:	  Dhaka.	  Available	  
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21777>	  
World	  Bank	  2016.	  Doing	  Business	  2016:	  Measuring	  Regulatory	  Quality	  and	  Efficiency.	  World	  Bank:	  Washington	  
DC.	  
World	  Economic	  Forum	  2016.	  The	  Global	  Competitiveness	  Report	  2016-­‐2017,	  edited	  by	  Schwab,	  Klaus.	  World	  
Economic	  Forum:	  Geneva.	  
About the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium:
ACE takes an  innovative approach to anti-corruption policy and practice. Funded 
by UK aid, ACE is responding to the serious challenges facing people and economies 
affected by corruption by generating evidence that makes anti-corruption real, and 
using those findings to help policymakers, business and civil society adopt new, 
feasible, high-impact strategies to tackle corruption.
ACE is  a partnership of highly experienced research and policy institutes based 
in Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania, the United Kingdom and the USA. The lead 
institution is SOAS, University of London. Other consortium partners are:
• London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM),
• Palladium, London
• University of Birmingham
• University of Columbia, New York
• BRAC Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD), Dhaka
• Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), Dhaka
• James P. Grant School of Public Health BRAC University (JPGSPH), Dhaka
• Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), Dar es Salaam
• Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), Dar es Salaam
• Ifakara Health Institute (IHI), Dar es Salaam
• Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), Lagos
• Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja
• University of Nigeria Nsukka (UNN)
ACE also has well a established network of leading research collaborators  
and policy/uptake experts.
Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium
SOAS, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H OXG
T +44 (0)20 7898 4447 • E ace@soas.ac.uk • W www.ace.soas.ac.uk
Disclaimer: This publication is an output of a research programme funded by UK aid from the UK 
Government. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent 
the views of UK Government’s official policies.
Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from ACE research for their own publications. As 
copyright holder ACE, requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication.
